THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA, 1912–2003*

Noam Lupu
Princeton University

Susan C. Stokes
Yale University

Abstract: To what extent has the Argentine party system been polarized along class lines? The political historiography gives mixed and contradictory answers to this question. We explore the social bases of Argentina’s political parties using an original database, the most comprehensive database of Argentine elections yet assembled, and new methods of ecological inference that yield more reliable results than previous analyses. We identify two distinct party systems, one in place between 1912 and 1940, the other emerging after 1946. The first party system was not consistently class based, but the second was, with the Radical Party representing the middle classes and the Peronists, workers and the poor. Still, there were important exceptions. Lower-class support for the Peronists, as proxied by literacy rates, declined during Perón’s exile, which implies that the party had trouble mobilizing lower-class illiterate voters. Since the return to democracy in 1983, class polarization has again found some expression in the party system.

Ever since the meteoric rise of Peronism in the 1940s, scholars of Argentina have debated the socioeconomic bases of this mass-movement-cum-political party. Some scholars characterize Peronism as a party representing the working class, a class previously excluded from Argentine electoral politics (Butler 1969; Canton, Jorrat, and Juarez 1976; Huerta Palau 1963; Kirkpatrick 1971; Lipset 1981; Manzetti 1993; Ranis 1979; Smith 1969; Snow 1969). Others view Peronism as merely a more electorally important successor to an existing working-class party, the Socialists (Adelman 1992; Canton 1973; Canton and Jorrat 1996, 1998; Walter 1978). Still others see Peronism as a multiclass movement that depended on a coalition of class interests (Germani 1955). Understanding Peronism as a multiclass phenomenon, they argue, helps explain the party’s fragility and Perón’s eventual ouster in 1955 (Kenworthy 1973, 1975; Schoultz 1977; Smith 1972).

* For their comments, advice, and data, we thank Ernesto Calvo, Darío Canton, Gary King, Marcelo Nazareno, Luis Schiumerini, and Jason Wittenberg. Christie Kim, Mayanka Mudgal, Amy Swanson, and Chen Zhao provided excellent research assistance. We especially wish to thank Valeria Brusco.

At stake in this debate are basic facts animating Argentine political history. Did Juan Domingo Perón forge a workers’ party or a multiclass movement, and did party competition express or paper over a deep class divide? Did the emergence of Peronism transform the Argentine political landscape, or did it merely continue the conflict that had until then found expression in competition between the Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical) and the Socialists? Behind these questions lie other inquiries, with implications for theories of political development (Adelman 1992), the rise of popular authoritarianism (Germani 1973; Kirkpatrick 1971; Schoultz 1977), the role of mass mobilization (Lipset 1981; Smith 1969), and the relative importance of structural versus behavioral factors in voter choice (Canton and Jorrat 2002; Seligson 2003).

This article offers conceptual and empirical contributions to these important ongoing debates. We explore the class bases of electoral politics using an original database, the most comprehensive database of Argentine elections yet assembled. We also employ state-of-the-art methods of ecological inference that yield more reliable results than previous analyses. Ultimately, we attempt to reduce the murkiness of these discussions by offering clearer conceptual criteria for calling parties and party systems class-based and multiclass.¹

THE SOCIOECONOMIC CLEAVAGE IN ARGENTINA

Among Latin American polities, Argentina is considered distinctive in that the class cleavage between owners and workers was the only one that generated competing political parties; neither pro-Church/anticlerical nor regional and urban-rural divides became party-generative, as they were in several other countries (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Still, the evidence is mixed for the claim that the socioeconomic cleavage is the main division along which Argentine political parties were organized.

Before Peronism, 1912–1946

If there is a conventional wisdom about the mapping of social class onto party politics in the early decades of Argentine democracy, it is that the Radicals represented the emerging middle classes (Johnson 1958), the Socialist party represented workers in the nascent labor movement (Adelman 1992), and conservative parties represented the elite (Botana 1977). The Radical Party, in this view, had its foundations among middle-class sharecroppers and small farmers of the country’s vast arable lands, who

¹. Our conceptualizations of class-based or multiclass parties and party systems refer to the social class of voters who support the parties, and not to the parties’ ideologies or programs.
were protesting against the influx of immigrants and against their own exploitation at the hands of large landowners (Alonso 2006; Persello 2004; Rock 1975). Their principle competitors, various conservative parties, represented provincial landholders.

However, other scholars paint a more complex picture. Conservative parties, even if they represented provincial landholders, also relied on electoral support from rural day laborers (jornaleros), even if they exacted this support through coercion. And there are doubts as to how capable the Socialist Party was of reaching the urban lower class. Walter (1984, 715) characterized the Socialist Party as well organized and enjoying “some strength in suburban and coastal districts,” but never gaining “a firm foothold in the countryside” or managing “to gather more than 5 to 10 percent of the total vote.”

The picture emerging from quantitative studies is murky as well. Using ecological data that included electoral returns and occupational structures, Germani (1955) and Snow (1969) argued that neither the Radicals nor the Socialists were labor-based parties, and that class-based voting in Argentina began only in 1943. In contrast, the findings of Canton and Jorrat (1996) and Walter (1978), studying pre-1930 elections, were more in line with the conventional view; that the conservatives tended to depend on wealthier voters, the Socialist Party on the urban working class, and the Radical Party on the middle class. Adelman (1992, 243) supports the idea that class politics emerged well before Peronism and argues against the “stubborn impression of a weak and feeble labour movement in Argentina prior to the rise of Perón.”

In his later work on Greater Buenos Aires in the era before Perón, however, Walter (1984) argues that both the Radical Party and conservative parties attempted to develop a multiclass base, though with mixed success. He concludes that “there is no clear-cut or simple correlation between socioeconomic groups and party support” (729). Regarding the Radical Party, Canton and Jorrat (1998, 146) find that, between 1936 and 1942, the Radical vote “repeated the patterns faintly established in the years 1912–1930, suggesting a party encouraged by various sectors without being preeminent among any of them.” The one exception was the election of 1937, when the Radicals presented an urban labor-based candidate who promised to clean up elections and remove conservative provincial leaders from power.

The conflicting findings may, as Canton and Jorrat (1998) remark, reflect problems of periodization. Ecological studies have also focused on distinct regions of the country, some studying returns across the whole country (e.g., Canton and Jorrat 1980; Canton, Jorrat, and Juarez 1976; Kirkpatrick 1971; Mora y Araujo 1975; Smith 1972), some in a single province.

2. The Radical Party did not participate in elections between 1930 and 1936.
The Impact of Peronism, 1946–2003

After Perón’s decisive victory in 1946, it is generally accepted that the Radicals became the party of the middle and upper-middle classes, and the Peronists the party of the workers, the popular sectors, and the lower-middle classes. Yet there is much scholarly controversy here too, beginning with the election of 1946—an election that is often thought to have marked a realigning of the party system. Considered one of the cleanest elections in Argentine history (Romero 2002), it brought Perón to power and Peronism to the Argentine electoral landscape. Having split the Radical party, Perón immediately set about consolidating his power and recreating the Argentine state along corporatist lines. He dissolved the labor unions that had supported him as well as his own Labor Party, subordinating them to the newly formed Peronist Party (Little 1973b; Ranis 1979), which was largely personalist (McGuire 1997). The increasing authoritarianism of Perón’s rule, which relied on his ability to mobilize mass protests and to gain the support of the rural poor, suggests the origins of popular authoritarianism (Germani 1973; Kirkpatrick 1971; Lipset 1981; Schoultz 1977; Smith 1969).

Still, ecological data analyses have produced conflicting answers to the question, Was early Peronism a class-based movement? A seminal study of the city of Buenos Aires by Germani (1955) found that Perón’s victory depended on the working classes. Smith (1972), however, examines ecological data from 365 departments across the country and finds no correlation between Peronist vote share and the socioeconomic makeup of the department. Although Perón’s urban voters came, according to Smith, mostly from the working classes, his rural bases of support were multi-class, a finding echoed by Kenworthy (1973) and Wellhofer (1977).

Others, in contrast, have found clear class distinctions between Peronist and Radical electoral constituencies during Perón’s regime (Canton and Jorrat 1998; Canton, Jorrat, and Juarez 1976; Little 1973a). Canton and

---

3. This finding is echoed by Schoultz’s (1977) study of both the city of Buenos Aires and the province of Buenos Aires.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Type of data</th>
<th>Period covered</th>
<th>Region covered</th>
<th>Level of aggregation</th>
<th>Relevant findings</th>
<th>Class cleavage?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germani (1955)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1940, 1942</td>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Districts (circunscripciones)</td>
<td>- Socialist vote is weakly correlated with occupation</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1946, 1948</td>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Districts (circunscripciones)</td>
<td>- Peronist vote highly correlated with working classes, Radical vote with middle classes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huerta Palau (1963)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>City of Córdoba</td>
<td>Wards (circuits)</td>
<td>- Radical and conservative votes show no correlation with occupation</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1962, 1963</td>
<td>City of Córdoba</td>
<td>Wards (circuits)</td>
<td>- Peronist vote highly correlated with working classes, Radical vote with middle classes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snow (1969)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Selected wards (circuits)</td>
<td>- Peronism largely a movement of lower and lower-middle classes; but Peronist support not limited to lower classes</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkpatrick (1971)</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Radical party is multiclass</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forni and Weinberg (1972)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1946–1965</td>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Selected districts (circunscripciones)</td>
<td>- Lower classes correlated with support for Peronists in 1946 and 1954</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Peronists lose lower class votes during proscription</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>Findings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith (1972)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Districts (departamentos)</td>
<td>Peronist vote is weakly correlated with socioeconomic variables, more class-based in urban areas, Peronism a loose coalition of differing social groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little (1973a)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1951, 1954</td>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Wards (circuitos)</td>
<td>Workers and lower sectors of the middle class correlated with support for Peronists, middle and upper classes with other parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mora y Araujo (1975)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>March, September 1973</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>Workers and Peronist vote are negatively correlated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton, Jorrat, and Juarez (1976)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1946, March 1973</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>Worker sectors highly correlated with support for Peronists, non-worker sectors with other parties, Some variation in 1946 between more- and less-developed sectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1946–1973</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Districts (departamentos)</td>
<td>Peronist support most highly correlated with workers, Lower classes correlated with vote for Peronists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Type of data</th>
<th>Period covered</th>
<th>Region covered</th>
<th>Level of aggregation</th>
<th>Relevant findings</th>
<th>Class cleavage?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wellhofer (1977)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1946, 1954</td>
<td>Outside Greater Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Districts (departamentos)</td>
<td>- No clear association between social class and Peronist vote - Radical support weakly associated with middle classes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton and Jorrat (1978)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>March 1973, September 1973</td>
<td>National Greater Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Districts (departamentos)</td>
<td>- Workers correlated with support for Peronism, professionals and students with other parties - But workers not always majority of Peronist vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter (1978)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>1916–1922</td>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Districts (circunscripciones)</td>
<td>- Socialists drew support from working class, Radicals from middle class, and conservatives from upper class - Neither Socialists nor Radicals did well among students</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton and Jorrat (1980)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>March 1973, September 1973</td>
<td>National Greater Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Selected precincts (mesas)</td>
<td>- Workers correlated with support for Peronism, professionals and students with other parties</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mora y Araujo and Smith (1983)</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>March 1973</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Districts (departamentos)</td>
<td>- Lower levels of social development and higher levels of social deprivation are associated with the Peronist vote</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Findings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorrat (1986)</td>
<td>Survey of men</td>
<td>March 1973</td>
<td>Cities of Córdoba and Tucumán</td>
<td>Worker support for Peronists twice that for Radicals; Self-employed and professionals split their vote between radicals and Peronists.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Cities of Córdoba and Tucumán</td>
<td>Workers equally likely to vote for Radicals and Peronists; Self-employed and professionals more likely to vote Radical; Radical Party appears multiclass; Peronist party primarily supported by workers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catterberg (1990)</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>1983–1987</td>
<td>Greater Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Workers more likely to support Peronists; professionals and self-employed more likely to support Radicals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Type of data</th>
<th>Period covered</th>
<th>Region covered</th>
<th>Level of aggregation</th>
<th>Relevant findings</th>
<th>Class cleavage?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Canton and Jorrat (1996)  | Ecological   | 1912–1930      | City of Buenos Aires | Districts (circunscripciones) | - Workers more highly correlated with vote for Socialists than other parties, middle classes with conservative parties  
- Radicals occupy a sliding position lacking class link but weakly linked to middle classes | Yes             |
|                           |              |                |                |                      |                                                                                 |                 |
| Canton and Jorrat (1997)  | Ecological   | 1957–1973      | City of Buenos Aires | Districts (circunscripciones) | - Workers correlated with vote for Peronists, middle classes (more weakly) with Radicals | Yes             |
|                           |              |                |                |                      |                                                                                 |                 |
| Canton and Jorrat (1998)  | Ecological   | 1931–1942      | City of Buenos Aires | Districts (circunscripciones) | - Workers correlated with vote for Socialists, middle classes with conservative parties, with Radicals lacking a class link  
- Workers correlated with vote for Peronists, middle classes with Radicals | Yes             |
|                           |              |                |                |                      |                                                                                 |                 |
|                           |              | 1946–1954      | City of Buenos Aires | Districts (circunscripciones) |                                                                                 | Yes             |
|                           |              |                |                |                      |                                                                                 |                 |
| Canton and Jorrat (2002)  | Survey       | 1995, 1999     | Greater Buenos Aires |                      | - Class is not a significant determinant of voting in 1995, but is significantly and positively related to Peronist voting in 1999 | Mixed           |
Jorrat (1998, 150) find that, for the period 1946–1954, the Peronists showed “a clearly ‘popular profile,’” with the Radicals representing “the other side of the coin, with very high positive correlations with sociodemographic variables or occupational indicators of wealth and negative correlations with those indicating poverty.”

Some evidence from the city of Buenos Aires points toward a continuation of these strong class differences in the parties’ constituencies after the 1955 military coup that overthrew Perón (Canton and Jorrat 1997). They persisted even though Perón and the Peronist party were proscribed from running as candidates. The middle and upper classes voted for the Radical candidates; the working and lower classes voted for Peronist candidates or, following the instructions Perón sent from exile, cast blank ballots. Huerta Palau’s (1963) study of the 1962 and 1963 elections in Córdoba and Forni and Weinberg’s (1972) study of the city of Buenos Aires show similar correlations between occupation and vote. And Kirkpatrick’s (1971, 96) surveys find that “Peronists were confirmed as being disproportionately drawn from among the lower ‘popular’ classes.” However, Snow (1969, 166), examining data from the 1957 constituent-assembly election, for which Perón instructed his followers to cast blank ballots, shows that “Peronist support is by no means limited to the lower class, nor are the Radical voters uniformly from the middle classes.”

In 1973, following a seven-year military dictatorship, Argentina returned to democracy and Perón returned to Argentina. The military barred him from running in the March 1973 presidential election. His supporters in the military provoked a massacre, forcing the new president to resign and new elections to be held in September. This time Perón ran and won; his victory was reminiscent of his 1946 victory. For scholars of Argentine politics, the contrast between the two elections provides an excellent test of whether a majority of the popular sectors still backed Peronism, and even Perón himself.

Canton and Jorrat (1978, 1980) and Canton, Jorrat, and Juarez (1976) found that, in both elections, a majority of workers indeed still backed Peronism, which confirms “the ‘traditional view’ of a dichotomous division between worker ‘support’ and non-worker ‘rejection’” (Canton and Jorrat 1980, 91, our translation). However, using province-level data from across the country, Mora y Araujo (1975) found, surprisingly, a negative correlation between the proportion of working-class voters and the Peronist vote in both of the 1973 elections.5

Studies of social class and voting that cover the current, post-1983 period of democracy in Argentina have benefited tremendously from the use of survey rather than just ecological data. Their results again tell a more complex story about class cleavages than one might expect. Jorrat

---

5. See also Jorrat (1975) and Mora y Araujo and Smith (1983).

Thus, we see that evidence of a socioeconomic cleavage in Argentina during the twentieth century is murky. The evidence comes from different regions, scholars focus on distinct time periods, and few early students had access to individual-level data. Earlier studies also lacked techniques now available for drawing reliable inferences from ecological data to individual voter choices. Given these shortcomings, it is unsurprising that studies that were in many ways exemplary nevertheless produced confusing and sometimes contradictory results regarding the class bases of political parties in Argentina.

DATA, METHODS, AND CONCEPTS

We attempt to present a clearer picture, one that takes account of the country as a whole over its entire electoral history, by constructing a large ecological data set. The units of our analysis are departments. We observe departmental election returns for each national (presidential and congressional) election. We thus study thirty-four national elections in roughly four hundred departments. The elections cover the period from 1912, when the secret ballot, voter registration rolls, and compulsory voting were introduced, until 2003. The data set hence contains more than thirteen thousand observations. We matched these returns with data from

6. Jorrat (1986) also notes that this split is imperceptible at the aggregate level using simple correlations, a result he attributes to ecological fallacy.
7. See appendix A for further explanation of our data, sources, and calculations. Voting is compulsory in Argentina and voter turnout is consistently in the range of 70 percent to 90 percent. We therefore do not expect significant discrepancies between census data covering entire district populations and electoral results covering only those who turn out to vote.
8. Given Argentina’s highly fragmented federal system, party labels and interparty alliances vary between provinces and over time. Still, there is considerable continuity in the presence of the two major parties and the ability of voters to identify them across provinces and election years. In a number of elections, multiple candidates from the same party ran against one another. Most recently, in 2003, three Peronist candidates competed for the presidency. Our aggregation of these party labels (see appendix B) under the general headings of Radical, Socialist, conservative, and Peronist nevertheless is justified. These were fleeting party divisions that generally disappeared by the following election. The only
seven national censuses conducted over the course of the twentieth century and in 2001. In particular, we included data on literacy and urbanization. Following previous authors such as Canton and Jorrat (1998), we use literacy as a proxy for social class. Note that we do not assume that no workers were literate, simply that literacy rates are highly correlated with social class.9

A basic question ecological studies must address is whether we can draw inferences from aggregate election returns to the voting choices of individuals. Simple cross-tabulations between vote shares and demographics run the risk of falling into an ecological fallacy. Consider, for instance, that one had observations of literacy rates and voting returns across all departments for a given election, and found a strong correlation between literacy and support for the Radicals. One might be tempted to infer that literate voters tend to vote for the Radical Party. But it might be the case that, in districts with high literacy rates, illiterates are highly likely to vote for the Radicals. We would then falsely infer a strong class pattern of support for the parties when the reality is one of multiclass support.

The problem that aggregate data present is that we know the marginals—in this case, the percentage of voters in a district who vote Radical or Peronist and the percentage who are literate and who are illiterate—but not the interior cells: the percentage of literates who vote Radical or the percentage of illiterates who vote Peronist. And it is these interior cells that we want to know. The basic approach to ecological inference, recently furthered by King (1997), was, first, to determine the range of possible interior-cell values and then to use the variation in these ranges across units (precincts, departments) to generate estimations of the interior values. Observations of the range of possible interior values from a large number of districts can then be used to generate estimations of the interior cells for each district and for the population as a whole. In our study, rather than the cross-tabulations and correlations that earlier

---

9. We have evidence that literacy rates correlate closely with class. Using data from the partial census of 1927 (Canton and Moreno 1971), we calculated the correlation between literacy and the proportion of “Employees,” a category that includes skilled or white-collar workers such as inspectors, pilots, and bankers. The correlation coefficient was 0.88. The correlation between literacy and the proportion of “Workers, Assistants, and Day Laborers,” a category that includes unskilled or blue-collar workers such as factory workers, merchants, and sweepers, was –0.72. Unfortunately, the other censuses either do not report data on occupations or collapse these two categories. Literacy rates are also a useful proxy because they vary a good deal both over time and across provinces. Although nationally Argentina reached and maintained high levels of literacy early in the twentieth century, in our data the average standard error for each year’s observations is 0.10. Even in the post-1983 period, roughly 230 department-year observations (covering eleven provinces) have levels of illiteracy above 20 percent.
researchers relied on, we employ recent techniques of ecological inference that gather additional estimation strength by using hierarchical modeling and Monte Carlo estimations. The resultant inferences enable us to more accurately calculate the proportions of types of voters across all departments who voted for the various parties that competed.

Before turning to our empirical results, however, we need to clarify what we mean by class-based versus multiclass parties and party systems. Obviously no political party relies exclusively on the members of a single social class for support. What do we mean, then, when we describe a political party as a lower-class or a middle-class party? One way to conceptualize a party as class based is that being a member of a given social class significantly increases the probability of supporting that party. This is the conceptualization that we employ here. We treat the interior-cell values that our estimations produce as probabilities that, for instance, an individual from the lower classes will vote Peronist or Radical, and we categorize parties according to these class-based probabilities.

To categorize the Argentine parties according to their class constituencies, we need to establish clear numerical criteria, even though cut points will obviously be arbitrary. Regarding individual parties, we describe them as being either (1) class-based parties of the poor, (2) class-based parties of the higher social strata (middle class), or (3) multiclass. We code a party as 1 (a class party of the poor) if the probability of supporting it is at least 50 percent greater for illiterate than for literate voters. We code a party as 2 (a class party of the middle and upper classes) if the probability of supporting it is at least 50 percent greater for literates than for illiterates. And we code a party as 3 (multiclass) if the difference in probabilities of support is 50 percent or less.

We are interested not just in the class constituencies of each party independently but also in the level of class polarization expressed in the party system. We conceptualize a party system as class polarized if at least two major parties draw the preponderance of their support from distinct social classes, one from the lower classes and another from the middle and upper classes. To give a sense of how these criteria work, consider the 1912 election. The probability of an illiterate voter supporting the Radical party was 21 percent, and the probability of a literate voter supporting the Radical party was 24 percent; hence, the difference between the two was less than 50 percent, and we categorized the Radicals as multiclass in this election. Turning to the Socialist Party, the probability of an illiterate voter

10. We estimate the hierarchical multinomial-Dirichlet model developed by King, Rosen, and Tanner (1999) and extended by Rosen, Wenxin, King, and Tanner (2001).
11. Unfortunately, as of yet these methods do not enable us to calculate confidence intervals for our estimates.
12. We use the terms poor, lower class, and popular sectors interchangeably.
supporting it was 59 percent, and of a literate voter, 20 percent; hence, the
difference was greater than 50 percent, so we classified the Socialist Party
as a class party of the poor in this election. Finally, the probability of an
illiterate individual voting for the conservatives in 1912 was 5 percent,
and the probability of a literate voter, 44 percent; again the difference was
greater than 50 percent, and we coded the conservatives as a class party
of the middle class. Because two of the three parties in this election were
class parties, we classify the party system in 1912 as a polarized system.

RESULTS

The Class Cleavage and the Party Systems

Table 2 lists the estimated percentages of literates and illiterates who
voted for the Radical, Socialist, and conservative parties at each election
prior to Peronism. We also report the differences between literate and illit-
erate vote probabilities for each party, and our classification of the party in
that election as poor, middle class, or multiclass. Boldface years in table 2
indicate class-polarized elections. In figure 1, we plot the difference be-
tween the likelihood that a literate person would vote for each party and
the likelihood that an illiterate person would cast such a vote.

A close look at table 2 reveals some surprising facts about the class
bases of the Socialist and conservative parties. Whereas Schoultz (1977)
and Walter (1978) uncovered a correlation between the proportion of
workers and the Socialist vote share in precincts of the city of Buenos
Aires (but see Germani 1955; Walter 1984), our analysis shows that, tak-
ing into consideration departments throughout the country, the constitu-
ency of the Socialists in this early period was consistently middle class.
The only exception was the first democratic election, in 1912. Furthermore,
whereas Canton and Jorrat (1996, 1998) found a correlation between lit-
eracy and support for conservative parties in Buenos Aires, we find that,
in the country as a whole, far from being the political expression of the
elite, the conservative parties were distinctly multiclass. Presumably this
multiclass support reflected a coalition of urban elites and rural jornaleros,
as Walter (1984) contended. We also find the Radical Party to have been
largely multiclass.

13. The difference was –39 percent, which is 66 percent of 59 percent.
14. We are confident that our measure of literacy is not skewed by the influx of immi-
grants to Argentina in this early part of the century, for two reasons. First, our indicator
from the 1914 census measures literacy among registered voters and therefore excludes
non-citizens (see Appendix A). Second, inspection of census data reveals, surprisingly,
that the distribution of illiterates among Argentines and foreigners appears very similar
in this period. At least in 1914, 49 percent of Argentines and 43 percent of foreigners were
illiterate.
## Table 2  Class Cleavage in Radical, Socialist, and Conservative Votes, 1912–1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Probability of voting for Radicals (%)</th>
<th>Probability of voting for Socialists (%)</th>
<th>Probability of voting for conservatives (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>+43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Values are hierarchical multinomial-Dirichlet estimates of the percentage of literate/illiterate voters in all departments who cast votes for the radical, Socialist, and conservative parties (see Rosen et al. 2001). Estimates were implemented using Wittenberg and Bhaskar’s (2005) R code. Multi means multiclass support; middle means middle- or upper-income (literate) support; poor means lower-class (illiterate) support. Boldface election years are those in which the parties were class polarized.
Table 3 and figure 2 report results for the post-1946 period after the rise of Peronism. They tend to support the conventional historiographical wisdom about this era in Argentine political history, developed by scholars such as Snow (1969), Kirkpatrick (1971), Little (1973a), Canton and Jorrat (1978, 1980), and Jorrat (1986), and contradict authors who have found that class has no effect on voting. They certainly go against Mora y Araujo’s (1975) finding of a negative relationship between working-class presence and Peronist vote. Once the country had settled into a two-party system that pitted Radicals against Peronists, the Radical Party generally drew support from the middle classes and the Peronists from the poor.

Thus, our data reveal two distinct party systems, one predating the entrance of the Peronist party in 1946 and one following it. At one level, this difference is trivially obvious: the Socialist and conservative parties were eclipsed and became minor actors, if they persisted at all. But even when we examine the class basis of the one major party that persisted across the two periods, the Radical Party, it is clear that its social foundations shifted. In the pre-Peronist era, it was a multiclass party with a tug toward the poor. In the Peronist era, it became mainly a party of the middle and upper classes.

Some of our findings are discordant with the conventional wisdom. The conventional view of the 1946 election—the first election in which
Table 3. Class Cleavage in Radical and Peronist Votes, 1946–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lit.</th>
<th>Illit.</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Lit.</th>
<th>Illit.</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1948</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+31</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1948</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+32</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+32</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+38</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+24</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>+28</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1973</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+24</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1973</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+29</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+48</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+47</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-74</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+21</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+38</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+46</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-61</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values are hierarchical multinomial-Dirichlet estimates of the percentage of literate/illiterate voters in all departments who cast votes for the Radical and Peronist parties (see Rosen et al. 2001). For the 1946 election, observations are further divided between urban (urbanization level greater than 0.50) and rural departments (urbanization level less than or equal to 0.50). Estimates were implemented using Wittenberg and Bhaskar’s (2005) R code. Multi means multiclass support; middle means middle- or upper-income (literate) support; poor means lower-class (illiterate) support. Boldface elections are those in which the parties were class polarized.

Perón competed and the subject of much scholarly attention—is that Perón immediately commanded overwhelming popular-sector support. However, our results suggest that illiterates in 1946 were more likely to support the Radicals than the Peronists, though neither party could be said to have depended overwhelmingly on one group over the other. Did the Peronists’ multiclass support reflect its failure, in this early election, to capture the votes of the poor in the countryside? This was the contention of Kenworthy (1973), Smith (1972), and Wellhofer (1977). To investigate, we divided our 1946 sample into urban and rural departments and reran our analyses. The results, also shown in table 3, indeed indicate that, although
both parties drew voters from across class lines, urban illiterates were more likely to support Perón and rural illiterates were more likely to support José Tamborini, Perón’s Radical opponent. Not until the 1948 election and thereafter does a pattern emerge that is consistent with the conventional view of the class cleavage mapping neatly onto the Radical-Peronist divide. Of course from the outset, Perón had close links with unions in the General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General de Trabajo), forged during his tenure as minister of labor in the 1943–1946 military regime. But he needed two years of presidential power to mobilize heavy support among the rural poor.

The conventional wisdom of a class-polarized system is also inaccurate with regard to the period of Perón’s exile, when the Peronist party was proscribed from presenting candidates (1957–1965). In 1960, the class-party linkages were reversed, with the poor supporting the Radical Party

15. In the case of the 1958 election, we unable to truly distinguish between Radical and Peronist votes. Following negotiations between Radical candidate Arturo Frondizi and Perón, the former dictator instructed his followers to vote for Frondizi, which makes their votes difficult to distinguish.

Figure 2: Class Cleavage in Radical and Peronist Votes, 1946–2003.

Note: Values are differences between the estimated probability of literates voting for a party and of illiterates voting for that party across all departments in each election year (see table 2).
and middle-class voters supporting the Peronists. No stark class division appeared even in 1962, when Peronist candidates were allowed to run in legislative elections and won some of the country’s most important provinces. It seems proscription indeed hampered the Peronists’ ability to mobilize poor voters. Previous findings concluded otherwise on the basis of data from either the city of Buenos Aires or Córdoba (Canton and Jorrat 1997; Huerta Palau 1963; Snow 1969). But our findings are based on national data not limited to these urban centers. The discrepancy suggests that the Peronists had greater difficulty communicating Perón’s instructions from exile to poor voters outside the cities.16

Not until the two elections of 1973—the first one following Perón’s return to Argentina and the second returning him to the presidency—did the Peronist-Radical divide again crystallize along class lines. In both elections, few illiterates voted for the Radical candidate, and an overwhelming majority of illiterates voted for the Peronists. In stark contrast to the 1946 election that first brought Perón to power, in September 1973, Perón received almost-unanimous support from illiterates in the countryside as well as in the cities. Perón also, in 1973, garnered a majority of literate voters.

During the current (post-1983) democratic period, class divisions between the parties’ supporters mostly have followed the conventional wisdom, with the Radical Party representing the middle and upper classes against the Peronist Party, favored by workers and lower classes. Still, there are some exceptions. The 1989 election brought the Peronist Carlos Menem to the presidency on the basis of relatively even support from literates and illiterates. This election took place in the midst of hyperinflation and violent street protests, and hence a generalized collapse of the incumbent Radical Party’s support. Once in office, Menem divided the labor movement and promoted a neoliberal economic agenda. Indeed, in 1995, the Radical Party garnered more support among the poor than among the middle class, reversing the historical pattern. Yet what is striking is how little interruption in lower-class support the Peronists suffered, even after Menem’s neoliberal turn: in 1997, 1999, and 2003, workers were still more likely to vote Peronist than Radical. The Peronists’ ability to hold onto working- and lower-class support has been attributed to a strategy of increased clientelism targeting the poor (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Levitsky 2003) and to Menem’s strategy of providing generous funding to poor, small provinces that were overrepresented in the national legislature (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Remmer and Wibbels 2000).

Just as the poor did not abandon the Peronists in droves despite the party’s neoliberal turn, the middle class did not bolt from the Radicals in favor of the Peronists. In the 1995 presidential election, which gave Menem a second term, middle-class voters left the Radical Party in favor of the Frente para un País Solidario (FREPASO), an alliance that opposed Menem’s neoliberal agenda. By 2001, the Peronist Party and Argentina’s confederation of labor unions had split along menemista and anti-menemista lines, and the Radicals—now in alliance with FREPASO—made inroads with the poor. But the December 2001 economic crisis and the resignation of the alliance’s Radical president left the party in tatters, leading to its abysmal electoral showing in 2003, in which only dedicated Radicals—basically all from the middle class—voted for its candidate.

Our findings concur, in turn, with the results reported by Canton and Jorrat (2002), drawing on surveys they conducted in Greater Buenos Aires in 1995 and 1999. Regarding 1995, Canton and Jorrat found no effect of class on voting, once controlling for the party identity of the voter. That is, a self-described Peronist who was lower class was no more likely to vote Peronist than was a self-described Peronist who was middle class. But in 1999, low-income voters were again more likely to vote Peronist than were middle-class voters, regardless of party affinities. Our ecological data from across the country show similar results. In 1995, the Radical Party appeared as a party of the poor and the Peronist Party as multiclass. But in 1999, the perennial pattern had reappeared: Radicals were the middle-class party and Peronists the party of the poor. This finding stands in stark contrast to previous authors’ assertions of a decline in class-based partisanship in Argentina (Roberts 2002).

What do our ecological analyses allow us to say about the class polarization of the system as a whole? The first party system, in place between 1912 and 1940, featured three major parties or groupings, two of them (the Radicals and conservatives) usually representing multiclass constituencies, and the third, the Socialists, a more elite constituency. Because of the prevalence of multiclass parties, we do not consider this system to have been class polarized. However, there were exceptions. In the very first democratic elections in Argentina, those of 1912 and 1914, we find sharp, though shifting, class divides. In 1912, the Socialist Party drew heavily on poor voters and the conservatives on wealthier voters. In 1914, the conservatives drew heavily on illiterate constituencies and the Socialists and Radicals on literate constituencies. Marked, though again shifting, class polarization reappeared in the 1928, 1930, and 1937 elections. Yet for the most part, this was a period of mixed class support for the parties.

Turning to the second party system, class polarization was generally the rule. The system was polarized in the 1940s and 1950s (except in 1957), in 1960 and 1963, and in the two elections of 1973. After the first two elec-
tions in the recent democratic period, this polarization persisted, but it eased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After 1995, the system largely regained its class-polarized character.

**An Urban-Rural Cleavage?**

There is another piece of the conventional wisdom that our data enable us to inspect: that social class is the only relevant cleavage underlying party politics in Argentina. Since the early days of Argentine democracy, Argentina has been a country in which huge metropolises (Greater Buenos Aires) and large cities (Córdoba, Rosario, Mendoza) coexist in the same provinces with tiny hamlets. Did an urban-rural divide underlie party politics? One might wonder, as well, whether literacy is a better proxy for urbanization than for social class. Perhaps our findings of a post-1946 party system generally polarized between popular sectors and middle classes really means that the party system was polarized around city and country constituencies. If so, we would expect a direct measure of urbanization to distinguish party supporters more powerfully than did literacy.

To test these propositions, we used procedures like those described earlier to explore the mapping of the urban-rural divide on party politics. Argentine censuses contained information about the proportion of the population in each department living in urban or rural settings, information that we included, at the level of the department, in our election database.

Figure 3 shows our estimations of the probability of urban and rural voters supporting the Radical, Socialist, and conservative parties prior to 1946. By the 50 percent difference criterion, the Radical and conservative parties appear almost always as drawing support from both urban and rural constituents, whereas support for the Socialist Party is overwhelmingly urban. Indeed, historians have noted that the Socialists never managed to mobilize voters beyond Buenos Aires (Rock 1975; Walter 1984), a fact that suggests why some previous studies using data only from the capital city have found a class-polarized system. The party system appears generally not to be urban-rural polarized, with the exception of the election of 1914, when the Radicals and Socialists drew votes overwhelmingly from cities and the conservatives from the countryside.17

Figure 4 shows our estimations of the probability of urban and rural voters supporting the Radical and Peronist parties, from 1946 to 2003. As discussed earlier, the Peronist Party in 1946 was a relatively urban party; but this urban bias was fleeting, and from the 1960s onward the Peronists

17. The 1930 and 1937 elections also show a trend toward urban-rural polarization.
Figure 3 Urban-rural Cleavage in Radical, Socialist, and Conservative Votes, 1912–1940.

Note: Values are differences between the estimated probability of urban citizens (departments with urbanization greater than 0.5) voting for a party and of rural citizens (departments with urbanization less than or equal to 0.5) voting for that party across all departments in each election year (estimates available from the authors).

The party system, in turn, was not polarized along an urban-rural cleavage. The only exception was the 1960 election; never after 1960 did the party system polarize around an urban-rural divide. Particularly striking is the contrast between figure 2 (probabilities of party support by literacy rates) and figure 4 (probabilities of party support by urbanization rates). The former shows a strong and persistent pattern of polariza-

18. The exceptions for the Radicals were during Perón’s first two presidential terms (1948 and 1954) and during the 1960 election, in which the party made inroads with rural voters. In the recent period of democracy, the transition election of 1983 unsurprisingly attracted urban voters to the Radical camp, and the postcrisis 2003 election pushed almost all voters away from the tarnished Radical Party. For the Peronists, the exceptions to its mixed urban-rural support base were primarily during the period of proscription, and then again in 1985 and 1999, both years in which urban voters found the party particularly unappealing.
tion around social class. The latter shows only muted differences around urbanization.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study clarifies the evolving relationship between class and party politics in democratic Argentina. Among our findings that will surprise some readers are that the Socialist Party drew support from the urban middle class and the Radicals and conservatives from the poor, mostly in the countryside. Another surprising finding is that Perón drew voters from across classes in 1946, and the rural working class in particular did not support Peronism until later.

Our findings cut against one interpretation of early Argentine democracy and the rise of Peronism. According to that interpretation, the class divide expressed itself in a class-polarized party system basically from the start; the effect of Peronism's appearance was to shift the political expression of the popular sectors from the Socialist Party (and to some degree the Radical Party) to the Peronists. But we have shown that this
interpretation is wrong on three counts: (1) the pre-1946, first party system featured multiclass parties; (2) the Socialist party was not a lower-class party but a middle-class party; and (3) Peronism did not immediately capture a ready-made, lower-class constituency.

Regarding the second party system, from 1946 until today, our findings are in line with the majority scholarly view: class divisions expressed themselves in the party system, with the Radical Party becoming the party of the middle class and Peronism the party of the *descamisados* (shirtless ones) and the poor. Yet here, too, we are able to identify exceptional moments and thus resolve contradictory findings from earlier studies. The Peronists’ capture of the popular-sector vote was delayed in the countryside until Perón had been in office; contrary to Forni and Weinberg (1972) and to Canton and Jorrat (1976), but consistent with Smith (1972) and Wellhofer (1977), the Peronist vote in 1946 was multiclass. In exile, the Peronists had difficulty maintaining their lower-class constituency (or at least getting their lower-class constituents to follow the party’s directives from afar). Is this because the party in exile relied on written propaganda to get its message across? Was it too hard to sustain organizational links to the labor movement (especially a divided labor movement) or the countryside from a distance? The finding suggests understudied obstacles that party leaderships (or, for that matter, governments in exile) face when they find themselves at significant geographic remove from their constituents and begs for further research.

Another new finding has to do with political instability and the class cleavage in the current democratic period in Argentina. During relatively stable interludes in the past quarter century, Argentina’s party system became an expression of the basic class cleavage. But this was less true during moments of instability. The country suffered economic crises and sociopolitical upheavals in the late 1980s through 1991, and from 2001 to 2002. These upheavals tended to efface linkages between class constituencies and their parties. In both instances, the Radical Party suffered significant erosion of support and the Peronists picked up middle-class adherents, some of whom may also have been attracted by Menem’s neoliberal program. Yet in the last presidential election, in 2003, the historical tendency toward a class-polarized system, in particular with the Peronist Party again representing the poor, had reasserted itself. The effects of crisis and instability on class polarization should shape the agenda of future research into the dynamics of party systems in developing democracies, in Argentina and beyond.

Finally, we offer yet another piece of evidence in favor of an emerging consensus that the Peronists managed, since the watershed Menem administrations of the 1990s, to engineer a major programmatic turn away from its traditional statist stance and toward neoliberalism without sacrificing its lower-class constituency. Several explanations suggest
themselves for this apparent disconnect between the class effects of the party’s program and the class character of its electoral bases. One is that the lower classes benefited in some ways from the Peronists’ new policies, especially to the degree that these policies were identified as the solution to the problem of hyperinflation. Another is that the mystique of Juan and Eva Perón was woven into working-class political culture in such a way that the party was cushioned from negative shocks that its programmatic shift might have caused. Yet another explanation, in line with important studies that use very different techniques and kinds of data, is that the Peronists compensated for programmatic switches by channeling clientelistic benefits to key segments of the electorate and patronage to small, poor, and overrepresented provinces.

APPENDIX A: DATA AND CALCULATIONS

Each observation in our ecological data set corresponds to an election in a department.

Electoral Data


Census Data

Argentina conducted national censuses with some regularity over the course of the twentieth century, in 1914, 1947, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, and again in 2001. These censuses provided us with the data on population, literacy rates, and urbanization rates by department. We interpolated

---

19. Note that we need not account for redistricting because our analyses do not examine changes within departments over time but rather across departments in each election.
these variables using simple rates of growth for years between censuses. Additional data are also available from provincial censuses for the federal capital (1936), La Pampa (1920, 1935, and 1942), and Santa Fe (1958). Results from the 1927 census (Canton and Moreno 1971), which surveyed only eligible voters (at that time Argentine men older than eighteen years), are reported only at the province level. Literacy measures vary somewhat across censuses, from the percentage of literate registered voters (1914) to the percentage of literate individuals older than fourteen years (1947, 1980) to the percentage of literate individuals older than ten years (1991, 2001). Urbanization is measured across all the censuses as the proportion of the population living in localities of at least two thousand inhabitants.

APPENDIX B: PARTY LABELS

Our calculation of each party’s vote shares includes votes cast for the parties and alliances listed below.


Socialists (only through 1940): Partido Socialista.

Conservatives (only through 1940): Concentración (1916–1922), Concordancia (1940), Partido Autonomista (1916–1930), Partido Conservador (1912–1940), Partido Constitucional (1912), Partido Demócrata (1914–1926), Partido Demócrata Nacional (1937), Partido Demócrata Progresista (1916–1930), Partido Independiente (1914), Partido Liberal (1916–1930), Partido Socialista Argentino (1916–1920), Partido Socialista Independiente (1930–1940), Unión Cívica (1912), Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista (1926–1930), Unión Cívica Radical Principista (1922 and 1926), Unión Nacional (1912), and Unión Provincial (1922–1930).


REFERENCES


20. Many Peronist voters cast blank ballots in the elections of 1957, 1960, and 1963, when Perón and the Peronist Party were proscribed. Indeed, the share of blank votes rose from a national average of 4.2 percent in 1948 to 19.4 percent in 1957 and 21.9 percent in 1960.
THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA, 1912–2003


Canton, Darío, and José Luis Moreno 1971 *Pequeño censo de 1927*. Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella.


Little, Walter
Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully, eds.
Manzetti, Luigi
McGuire, James W.
Ministerio del Interior
various Escrutinio definitivo de resultados electorales por departamento. Buenos Aires: Ministerio del Interior.
Mora y Araujo, Manuel
Mora y Araujo, Manuel, and Peter H. Smith
Persello, Ana Virginia
Ranis, Peter
Remmer, Karen L., and Erik Wibbels
Roberts, Kenneth M.
Rock, David
Romero, Luis Alberto
Rosen, Ori, Jiang Wenxin, Gary King, and Martin A. Tanner
Schultz, Lars
Seligson, Amber L.
Smith, Peter H.

Snow, Peter G.

Walter, Richard J.

Wellhofer, E. Spencer

Wittenberg, Jason, and Badri Narayan Bhaskar

Zalduendo, Eduardo