Blinded by Wealth?

What Voters Think About the Descriptive Underrepresentation of the Working Class[*]

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Abstract

Politicians the world over are vastly better off than the citizens they represent. Could that be because citizens simply do not know—or do not care—that their elected officials are so affluent? We analyze data from Argentina, Britain, and the US, three countries with longstanding imbalances in the social class makeup of government. We placed questions that asked about voters' perceptions of the social class makeup of their national legislatures on the 2015 Argentine Panel Election Study, a 2016 YouGov UK survey in Britain, and the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study in the US. In all three countries, voters substantially underestimated the economic gap between politicians and citizens, and even voters who favored significant increases in working-class representation did not think differently about other issues, participate more actively, or vote differently. There appear to be important limits to how much voters know and care about government by the privileged.

Do voters in electoral democracies realize how much better off their leaders are than they are? Do they care that they are so often governed by the privileged?

In most democracies, politicians tend to be vastly better off than the citizens they represent: they are wealthier, more educated, and more likely to come from white-collar jobs (e.g., Best 2007; Best and Cotta 2000; Matthews 1985). In the United States, *working-class* citizens[1]—people employed in manual labor, service industry, clerical, or informal sector jobs— make up over half of the labor force, but the typical member of Congress spent less than 2 percent of his or her pre-congressional career in working-class jobs. In Latin America, workers make up between 60 and 90 percent of the general public, but lawmakers from the working class make up just 5 to 25 percent of national legislatures (Carnes and Lupu 2015). In Europe, blue-collar workers make up large proportions of the electorate but have rarely made up more than 10 percent of national lawmakers (Best and Cotta 2000).

In the last few years, scholars have started paying renewed attention to these inequalities in the social class makeup of democratic governments. One emerging set of studies has focused on the *effects* of government by the privileged. Just as the shortage of women or racial and ethnic minorities in office seems to affect policy outcomes on issues related to gender and race (e.g.,

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[1] In this paper, we refer to a person as belonging to *the working class* (or as simply a *worker*) if he or she is employed in manual labor jobs (e.g., factory worker), service industry jobs (e.g., restaurant server), clerical jobs (e.g., receptionist), or union jobs (e.g., field organizer). Likewise, we define a person as having a white-collar job if she is not a part of the working class. Of course, there are other ways to disaggregate occupations (e.g., some people might not classify clerical jobs as working class), and other ways to measure class (e.g., education, income, wealth, family background, subjective perceptions, etc.). Most modern class analysts agree, however, that any measure of class should be rooted in occupational data, that is, information about how a person earns a living (e.g., Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1995; Weeden and Grusky 2005; Wright 1997). And the distinction between working-class jobs and white-collar jobs seems to be the major class-based dividing line in political institutions (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015). Lawmakers from working-class occupational backgrounds tend to vote differently than legislators from white-collar backgrounds; however, legislators with higher net worth, more formal education, or well-to-do parents tend not to behave as differently (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Sadin 2015). There are also important differences within the working-class and white-collar categories (e.g., between manual laborers and clerical workers), of course, but the major dividing line seems to be between workers, who tend to support more interventionist economic policies, and professionals, who tend to support more conservative economic policies.

Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Bratton and Ray 2002; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Franck and Rainer 2012; Pande 2003; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991), the shortage of working-class politicians—who tend to be more leftist on economic issues in most countries—appears to bias policy on issues like wage supports, taxation, and social welfare towards the more conservative positions typically favored by affluent citizens. In the United States (Carnes 2013; Grose 2013; Griffin and Anewalt-Remsburg 2013; Kraus and Callaghan 2014) and in other democracies (Carnes and Lupu 2015; O'Grady 2017; Rosset 2013), the numerical or descriptive underrepresentation of workers appears to have serious consequences for their substantive representation on issues of paramount importance. The shortage of politicians from the working class may also have symbolic consequences. Research in Latin America finds that in countries with fewer working-class politicians, citizens exhibit less trust in government and in democratic institutions (Barnes and Saxton 2017). Finally, there are important normative reasons to think that more descriptive representation of workers is desirable (Mansbridge 2015).

Building on these findings, another recent body of research has begun to investigate the *causes* of government by the privileged. If the shortage of lower-income and working-class politicians has such serious consequences, why don't more workers become politicians in the first place? Scholars have investigated hypotheses ranging from the decline of labor unions (e.g., Sojourner 2013) and social class gaps in competence (e.g., Dal Bó et al. Forthcoming) to voter biases against working-class candidates (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2016; Sadin 2012), and the low salaries paid to many sub-national officeholders (e.g., Carnes and Hansen 2016).

In this paper, we test another possibility suggested by the larger literature on politics and inequality, namely, that voters simply do not realize how well off politician are, or do not care enough to press for reforms that would change the social class makeup of government. Scholars

have long known that many people significantly underestimate the severity of social inequalities, like rising disparities in income and wealth; perhaps citizens under-estimate inequalities in who governs, too. And even voters who are aware of social inequalities often don't know what to do about them or care enough to take action; perhaps the same is true of voters who recognize that working-class citizens seldom hold office. If we wish to understand why democracies the world over are run by the privileged, we need to consider the possibility that voters simply do not know or do not care.

The goal of this paper is to understand how voters think about the numerical representation of the working class: how well-represented citizens think workers are in their political institutions, how well-represented they would like workers to be, and how those views influence their other political beliefs and actions. To do so, we analyze survey data from Argentina, Great Britain, and the United States, three countries that have long been governed by politicians who are disproportionately affluent relative to the average citizen. We placed a series of questions that asked about voters' perceptions of the social class makeup of their national legislatures on the 2015 Argentine Panel Election Study, a 2016 YouGov UK survey in Great Britain, and the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study in the US.

Across these three distinct national contexts, we find strikingly similar results. In all three countries, citizens mistakenly believe that workers are significantly better represented than they really are. Moreover, although many citizens in all three nations report that they would like more workers to hold office, they do not seem to place a great deal of importance on the issue: even respondents who favor significant increases in working-class representation do not tend to think differently about other issues, participate more actively in politics, or vote differently in elections.

4

These findings have important implications for research on descriptive representation and political equality. They highlight a previously undocumented and potentially foundational obstacle to working-class representation, namely, misinformation and apathy on the part of voters. This study also has important implications for reformers. Simply spreading the word about political inequality may not be enough to generate grassroots pressure for reform. There appear to be important limits to how much voters know about government by the privileged, and how much they care.

Public Perceptions and Working-Class Representation

To date, scholars have not had much success explaining why so few working-class people hold office in the world's democracies. Most studies have done more to *rule out* potentially promising explanations than to positively identify the forces responsible for the shortage of workers. Cross-national research has found, for instance, that the shortage of workers is *not* the result of voter biases against working-class candidates (Carnes and Lupu 2016; see also Campbell and Cowley 2014; Sadin 2012). Research on the US has shown that the shortage of politicians from the working class is *not* the result of a social class gaps in qualifications or ability (Carnes 2013) and is *not* the result of the low salaries paid to state and local officeholders (Carnes and Hansen 2016).

Even when scholars have successfully identified factors that predict working-class representation, moreover, those factors have only been able to account for a small fraction of the social class gap between ordinary citizens and the politicians who represent them. In the US, for instance, more workers hold office in states with stronger labor unions and less professionalized legislatures (Carnes 2016; see also Sojourner 2013), but the estimated differences across states

are small—usually only 5 to 10 percentage points—compared to the overall underrepresentation of workers—who make up about 50 percent of the labor force but go on to hold less than 3 percent of the seats in state legislatures. As it stands, research on the descriptive representation of the working class is still far from a complete answer to the question of why so few working-class people hold office in the world's democracies.

Part of the reason is that the descriptive representation of the working class varies so little over time and from place to place. In the US, working-class people have never made up more than 2 percent of Congress, and working-class representation in state legislatures in 2007 only ranged from 0 to 10 percentage points. Cross-nationally, there is little variation as well: across all of the Latin American democracies, the total range of working-class representation is just 20 percentage points. This is enough to detect associations between working-class representation and the factors that might drive it, of course. But because scholars seldom get to observe governments led by large numbers of workers—and never get to observe government led by more than a quarter working-class people—research designs that focus on explanations that vary over time or from place to place can probably only take us so far.

Scholars probably still have a lot to learn from research on factors that might matter *on the margin,* factors like unionization rates, electoral rules, party institutions, and so on. But there may also be *larger structural forces*—features of electoral democracies that do not vary—that discourage working-class people from holding office, or that simply create a status quo bias that reinforces the phenomenon of government by the privileged. Ultimately, there may not be many variables that predict significant differences in working-class representation from place to place; the real action might be in the intercept. Given the track record of recent efforts to explain variation in working-class representation—and the fact that workers are so sharply

underrepresented virtually everywhere—it may be time to begin asking whether there are larger, invariant features of the governing process in electoral democracies that discourage workers from holding office.

Two processes that would seem to fit the bill are *public inattention* and *public apathy*. If the public does not know about an issue or care about it, there is little hope that activists or lawmakers will address it. Moreover, it is entirely feasible that inattention or apathy on the issue of working-class representation might be near-universal, both within countries and across them. If citizens do not care about the numerical underrepresentation of the working class and do not demand action, chances are good that nothing will happen. And if citizens in *virtually all* electorates are unaware or indifferent, there will not be any variation on either the explanatory variable or the outcome variable. Inattention and apathy on the part of public could easily be invisible drivers of government by the privileged.

Is it realistic to expect citizens to be unaware of or indifferent to the social class makeup of their governing institutions? On the one hand, there are good reasons to think citizens would at least have a rough idea of the social class backgrounds of their leaders. During elections, campaigns and journalists often talk about the social class backgrounds of individual politicians. After the dust has settled, interest groups and media outlets sometimes publish reports summarizing the aggregate wealth, educational attainment, or occupational makeup of entire political institutions. In many countries, anyone with a computer can find out the social class makeup of their political institution in a matter of minutes.

There are also good reasons we might expect citizens to care. Politicians from different social classes tend to think and behave differently in office (in ways that mirror social class divisions in mass opinion; see, e.g., Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Grose 2013; Griffin

and Anewalt-Remsburg 2013). The shortage of politicians from the working class appears to tilt economic policy towards the interests of the privileged and against the interests of the less fortunate. Government *by* the rich is often government *for* the rich; wouldn't we expect the public to care about it?

Then again, there are also reasons to doubt that people know or care about the shortage of politicians from lower-income and working-class backgrounds. Probably the single most telling evidence on this point is the very fact that lawmakers all over the world are vastly better off than the people they represent. If the public were really concerned about the shortage of politicians from the working class, we would expect something to have been done about it by now. Many countries have implemented quotas for women or ethnic minorities (Bird 2014; Krook 2009), but we know of no large-scale reform efforts in any country designed to increase the numerical representation of lower-income or working-class people.

Public inattention may well be a part of the explanation. In general, most citizens do not know much about politics and government (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997). When it comes to distributional issues in particular, voters are notoriously bad at correctly assessing the state of things. In the US, for instance—a country with copious informational resources—citizens massively underestimate the share of wealth controlled by the richest quintile of citizens (Norton and Ariely 2011) and overestimate the percentage of the federal budget devoted to foreign aid (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). It is not difficult to imagine that voters might be similarly misinformed about the proportion of lawmakers from the working class.

Politicians themselves may contribute to the confusion. As scholars have long known, policymakers often exaggerate the adversity they have experienced and the connections that they share with lower-income and working-class people, for obvious strategic reasons. The practice—

termed "poormouthing" by historians (e.g., Pessen 1984)—is common, and could easily contribute to popular inattention to the shortage of politicians from the working class. If voters mistake rich politicians for working-class underdogs, they may not realize how rare politicians from the working class really are.

Moreover, even the citizens who do realize how few working-class politicians hold office might not care much about the phenomenon. There are many problems and issues that compete for voters' attention. And although the empirical evidence suggests that the shortage of politicians from lower-income and working-class backgrounds has significant consequences, the public often hears the opposite. In many electoral democracies, there are popular narratives that stress that politicians pursue "the common good" regardless of their backgrounds, that business leaders are better at generating shared prosperity, that working-class citizens are unfit to govern, and so on. In research on elections and hypothetical elections, voters do not exhibit a strong preference for candidates from the working class (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2016; Sadin 2012). For many citizens, the idea that working-class people seldom hold office simply may not inspire a great deal of anxiety or concern.

Third, even those citizens who *are* concerned may not seek out effective solutions. Voters sometimes struggle to connect their substantive complaints with appropriate policy solutions; even people who oppose economic inequality will back tax cuts that massively increase it (e.g., Bartels 2005). When it comes to the underrepresentation of the working class, moreover, reformers often advocate misguided proposals; some activists recommend raising legislative salaries to increase working-class representation, a reform that would most likely decrease working-class representation (Carnes and Hansen 2016). Voters might not know about the underrepresentation of workers, they might not care, and they might not know what to do

about it. And that may be an important piece of the larger explanation for why representative democracies are consistently run by economically unrepresentative politicians.

Evidence from the Argentina, Britain, and the US

To our knowledge, no prior study has ever examined voters' beliefs and opinions about the numerical underrepresentation of the working class. As such, we fielded original survey questions designed to measure the public's beliefs about the state of working-class representation today and—to gauge how much voters *care*—people's preferences about the ideal level of working-class representation, as well as their views on related issues, their choices in elections, and their engagement in civic life. If voters know how badly underrepresented workers are, they should be able to correctly estimate the share of working-class politicians in their legislature. If voters care, they should express a preference for more workers—and those who do should think or behave differently in some measureable ways.

We placed our questions on surveys in Argentina, Great Britain, and the United States, three country that are ideal for several reasons. First, all three have long histories of being governed by the privileged (like most democracies). As Table 1 illustrates, in Argentina, just 5 percent of the elected officials in the Chamber of Deputies (the country's national legislature) previously held working-class jobs, that is, manual labor, service industry, clerical, or informal sector jobs. By comparison, more than 10 times as many Argentine citizens—fully 73 percent of the country—are employed in working-class jobs (Carnes and Lupu 2015). In Britain, manual labor, service industry, and clerical occupations make up roughly half of the labor force as well, but just 4 percent of Members of Parliament come from working-class jobs. In the US, working-class people make up over half of the labor force, but the average member of Congress spent less

than 2 percent of his or her precongressional career in working-class jobs. In all three countries, some social process is leading workers to be sharply underrepresented in public office.

[Table 1 about here]

Importantly, however, these three countries differ substantially on other economic and political dimensions. As Table 1 illustrates, Argentina is a much newer democracy than Britain or the US. The political structures of these countries run the gamut from presidential to parliamentary, majoritarian to proportional, and two-party to multiparty. Partly as a result of these differences, these countries also use very different methods to select political candidates (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1995; Katz 2001; Norris 1997): British candidates are selected almost exclusively by party leaders, political candidates in the US typically have to win an open primary to run for office under the heading of a major party, and Argentina uses a mixed system. Argentina is a country where voters and politicians have historically given considerable thought to the demographic makeup of their government—in 1991, Argentina became the first Latin American country to enact a gender quota requiring 30 percent of the members of its national legislature to be women (by requiring each party's candidate list to include at least one woman for every two men). In Britain and the US, on the other hand, no such quota systems exist. The three countries also vary substantially in economic terms. Workers are a much larger proportion of the labor force in Argentina than in the other two countries. Unionization rates are far higher in Britain and Argentina than in the US, one likely reason that class is more politically salient in Britain and Argentina. And Argentina is less developed than Britain or the US in economic and human development terms.

Taken together, these three countries offer considerable variation on important political and economic variables that might somehow affect how voters think about the social class

makeup of government. If we find similar results across these three quite different contexts, we can be fairly confident that those results are not just unique to one country, one region, or one set of political institutions (Gerring 2007; Slater and Ziblatt 2013).

We developed a set of questions and placed them on ongoing or collaborative surveys in Argentina, Britain, and the US that gave us access to high-quality samples and survey instruments. In Argentina, we added those questions to the Argentine Panel Election Study (APES), a face-to-face, two-wave panel survey conducted in conjunction with the 2015 Argentine national elections (Lupu et al. 2015). Our questions were administered to 1,406 respondents in the post-election wave of the survey in November and December of 2015. In the US, we fielded questions through the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a 50,000-person national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. Our questions were administered in November and December of 2016 to a random subset of 1,000 respondents. And in Britain, we hired YouGov UK to put our questions to a representative sample of 1,681 respondents from its opt-in online panel in August of 2016.[2]

In Argentina, our questions about the numerical representation of the working class began, "We want to talk about the working class—people who do manual work or provide services, such as factory workers, maids, or servants." In Britain, the preface was worded slightly differently: "Now we want to talk about the working class—people who do manual labour work (like factory or construction workers), service industry work (like custodians or restaurant

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[2] In all of our analyses, we reweighted respondents using the weight variables created by the survey implementer. Whereas the Argentina survey was conducted face-to-face, the Britain and US surveys were conducted online. Questions asked in self-administered surveys are typically found to suffer much less from social desirability biases than those asked in interviewer-administered surveys (e.g., Tourangeau and Yan 2008). To the extent that our results are consistent across both survey modes, we can be quite confident that our findings are not an artifact of social desirability biases. The complete wording of all the survey questions in our analysis is provided in the online appendix.

servers), and clerical work (like receptionists)." In the US, we began, "We want to talk about the working class—people who do manual labor work (like factory or construction workers), service industry work (like custodians or restaurant servers), and clerical work (like receptionists)."

Respondents were then asked three questions about the political representation of the working class. To guard against question order effects, in all three surveys we randomized the order of the three questions. We also varied the wording of each question slightly from country to country. One of the three questions asked about the percentage of workers in *the general public*:

- The Argentina version asked, "If you had to guess, what percentage of the population in Argentina would you say belongs to the working class?"
- The British version asked, "If you had to guess, what percentage of the labour force in the UK would you estimate is employed in working-class jobs? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.[3])"
- And the US version asked, "If you had to guess, what percentage of the workforce in US would you estimate is employed in working-class jobs? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Another question asked about the percentage of workers among *political officeholders*. In Argentina and Britain, we asked about the national legislature. In the US, we randomized the level of office so that respondents were asked about Congress, their state legislatures, or their city councils:

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[3] This text was added to the British and US questions because they were administered online.

- Argentina: "If you had to guess, what percentage of National Deputies would you say come from the working class?"

- Britain: "If you had to guess, what percentage of Members of Parliament do you think come from the working class? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

- The US: "If you had to guess, what percentage of [members of Congress / state legislators in your state / the people on your town's city council] do you think come from the working class? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

And another question asked about the percentage of workers the respondent would want to hold political office *in an ideal world*. Again, in Argentina and Britain, we asked about the national legislature, and in the US we randomized the level of office.

- Argentina: "In an ideal world, what percentage of National Deputies would you like to come from the working class?"

- Britain: "Some people think that more politicians should come from working-class jobs. Others think more should come from white-collar professions. In an ideal world, what percentage of Members of Parliament would you want to come from the working class?"

- US: "Some people think that more politicians should come from working-class jobs. Others think more should come from white-collar professions. In an ideal world, what percentage of [members of Congress / state legislators in your state / the people on your town's city council] would you want to come from the working class?"

With these three questions, we were able to gauge how badly underrepresented respondents believed the working class was, and how well-represented they would like workers to be. By randomizing the order of the questions, we helped to guard against question order effects; by randomizing the level of office in the US, we were also able to determine whether the patterns we observed were limited to national legislatures or were more general; and by using a mix of face-to-face and online surveys, we hoped to guard against social desirability biases and the possibility that our results simply reflected respondents looking up the answers.

To provide a point of comparison, in the Argentina and Britain surveys (but not the US survey, due to space constraints), we also included a block of questions that asked the same three items about the numerical representation of *women*: "If you had to guess, what percentage of the population in Argentina would you say are women?", "If you had to guess, what percentage of National Deputies would you say are women?", and "In an ideal world, what percentage of National Deputies would you like to be women?" (and likewise for Britain[4]). (To check for possible question order effects, in the British survey, the order of the gender and social class blocks was randomized.) These additional questions provided us with a useful baseline for understanding how inaccurate voters' views about workers were. In Argentina (where party lists are subject to a well-known gender quota) and in Britain (where they are not) how do voters' views about the descriptive representation of working-class politicians compare to their views about the representation of women? Do voters realize how badly underrepresented the working

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[4] In Britain, the questions were, "If you had to guess, what percentage of the labour force in the UK would you estimate are female? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)", "If you had to guess, what percentage of Members of Parliament do you think are female? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)", and "Some people think there should be more women in Parliament. Others think it does not matter how many Members of Parliament are women. In an ideal world, what percentage of Members of Parliament would you want to be women?"

class is? And do those who think more working-class politicians should hold office report on other survey items that they think, vote, or behave differently in ways might that suggest that there is potential for grassroots opposition to government by the privileged?

Do Voters Know How Underrepresented Workers Are?

The left panels of Figure 1 begin to answer these questions by plotting the actual percentage of working-class people in the labor force and the national legislature in each country (the pair of bars on the left in each panel) and the average answers survey respondents gave to questions asking them to estimate these quantities—and to weigh in on the ideal percentage of working-class people in the legislature (the trio of bars on the right in each panel).

[Figure 1 about here]

Across all three countries, survey respondents generally understood that the percentage of workers in the labor force was high, and their estimates were often quite accurate: 50 percent in Britain (exactly right), 58 percent in the US (close to the correct estimate of 54 percent), and 59 percent in Argentina (off by the most; the reality is 73 percent).

However, respondents in all three countries significantly overestimated the percentage of working-class people in public office. In Argentina, just 7 percent of the Chamber of Deputies is from the working class, but the average respondent thought that 20 percent were. In Britain, the gap was similar: just 4 percent of Members of Parliament are from the working class, but the average respondent thought that 19 percent were. The disparity between perception and reality was largest in the US: respondents thought that officeholders (either Congress, state legislatures, or city councils, assigned at random) were 28 percent working class. The reality is 2 percent in Congress, 3 percent in state legislatures, and 10 percent in city councils. In all three countries,

workers make-up single-digit percentage of most political institutions, but citizens thought they

made up between one fifth and one quarter of political officeholders.

As a result, respondents tended to believe that working-class representation was far closer

to their ideals than it really was. In all three countries, the typical respondent said that in an ideal

world, working-class representation in public office would be similar to the working-class share

of the labor force. Because respondents believed that workers held more offices than they really

do, however, citizens in all three nations tended to think that working-class representation was

far closer to their ideal than it really was. In Argentina, for instance, there was a gaping 57

percentage point gap between worker representation in the average respondent's ideal legislature

(64 percent) and in the actual Chamber of Deputies (7 percent). However, the typical citizen

thought the gap was only 44 percentage points. In Britain, the gap between what voters said the

ideal representation of workers would be and the actual representation of workers in Parliament

was 41 percentage points, but the typical citizen thought that it was only 30 percentage points. In

the US, the perceptual errors were most stark: the gap between voters' ideals and the reality on

the ground was 55 percentage points, but citizens thought that it was only about half as large, 29

percentage points. Just as voters tend to recognize but underestimate inequalities in the

distribution of wealth in many countries, voters in Argentina, Britain, and the US know that

workers are underrepresented, but significantly underestimate how wide the gaps are.

In sharp contrast, voters in Argentina and Britain tended to know considerably more

about the representation of *women*. The average Argentine voter estimated that women made up

25 percent of the Chamber of Deputies, just 12 percentage points less than the share of seats

women actually hold. Whereas voters in Argentina underestimated how badly underrepresented

workers are (thinking the gap was 27 percentage points smaller than it really was), they actually

*over*estimated the gender gap in political officeholding (thinking it was 17 percentage points *bigger* than it really was). The same was true in Britain: the average voter estimated that women made up 25 percent of MPs, just 4 percentage points off the reality. And whereas the average voter underestimated how bad workers have it (thinking the gap was 16 percentage points smaller than it really was), they were far more cognizant of the challenges women face (thinking the gender gap was just 6 percentage points smaller than it really was). Voters in Argentina and Britain significantly underestimated the shortage of working-class politicians, both in absolute terms and compared how they saw the shortage of another historically underrepresented group.

Remarkably, the errors in how voters perceived working-class representation did not appear to be confined to any particular subgroup of the population. Figure 2 re-plots respondents' perceptions of workers' representation in the labor force, public office, and the ideal public office. In each row, we subset respondents by political knowledge,[5] occupation or household income,[6] and partisanship.

[Figure 2 about here]

Viewed this way, it is easy to see that the distribution of responses was essentially the same regardless of how we subset the data. In most cases, there were only single-digit differences between different groups' estimates: In Argentina, Front for Victory (*Frente para la Victoria*, FPV) partisans said that they believed that there were 4 percentage points more workers

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[5] All three surveys asked respondents a series of factual questions about politics. We coded each response as correct or not and, in Argentina and Britain, generated a factored index of correct responses, and then divided respondents into high, middle, and low thirds. In the US, we only had two factual questions, about the majority party in each chamber of Congress; we counted respondents who did not know the majority party in the House or Senate as least knowledgeable and respondents who knew the majority party in both as most knowledgeable. See online appendix for precise questions and factoring details.

[6] The APES reported open-ended occupations, which we coded. The YouGov UK survey and CCES included household income.

in the actual legislature than did Republican Proposal (*Propuesta Republicana*, PRO) partisans; in Britain the most knowledgeable respondents said that workers would hold 5 percentage points fewer seats in an ideal legislature. The only substantively large gap was in the British sample, where the richest citizens reported wanting a 37-percent working-class Parliament and the poorest reported wanting a 47-percent working class. Importantly, however, citizens' beliefs about how often workers held office never varied by more than a few percentage points—there was no subgroup of respondents who realized how badly underrepresented the working class really was in their country. In Argentina, Britain, and the US, citizens of all stripes—even the well-informed—significantly underestimate the extent to which they are governed by the privileged.

Simple robustness tests suggested that these patterns were not the result of the order in which we asked questions about the labor force, political institutions, and ideal political institutions,[7] or the order in which we asked about women as opposed to workers.[8] Our tests for level-of-office effects in the US yielded some substantively interesting findings: respondents rightly thought that workers were better represented in state legislatures and in city councils than in Congress, and citizens in the US reported wanting roughly the same share of workers in the

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[7] Table A1 in the online appendix lists the results of regression models that relate respondents' perceptions of workers' and women's representation in Argentina to the order that questions were asked in (the block about workers was always asked first). There were no consistent patterns, point estimates were substantively small, and question order was significantly associated with perceptions just one time out of 15, about what we would expect by chance alone. Tables A2 and A3 list the question order effects in Britain, first for the surveys that randomly asked about women's representation first, then for the surveys that randomly asked about worker's representation first (where we also asked a fourth question about how important the respondent thought descriptive representation was, randomizing its order along with the questions listed in Figure 1). Again, there were no consistent patterns, effect sizes were small, and less than 5 percent of estimated effects were statistically significant. Table A4 in the online appendix lists estimates of question order effects in the US. There, we found significant effects 5 times out of 15, enough to warrant closer investigation. However, again, effect sizes were small, and we found nothing that altered our substantive conclusions.

[8] Table A5 in the online appendix reports regression models relating the randomly-assigned block order (gender first or workers first) in the Britain survey to voters' perceptions of women's and worker's representation. Estimated effects were small—all around 1 percentage point, and only one in six was statistically significant.

ideal Congress, state legislature, or city council. But nothing in that robustness test changed our basic results: respondents in the US overestimated working-class representation (and therefore underestimated the shortage of workers) by 17 percentage points in Congress, 22 percentage points in state legislatures, and 13 percentage points in city councils.

Just as people tend to underestimate inequalities in distributional outcomes, regardless of how we looked at the data, citizens in Argentina, Britain, and the US seemed to significantly underestimate social class inequalities in officeholding, too. They are aware that workers are underrepresented in the national legislature, but they substantially underestimate that gap.

Do Voters Care?

The rare citizens who realized how severe inequalities in officeholding, moreover, did not seem to care all that much. In Figure 3, we subset respondents in each country based on the difference between the percentage of workers they believed was in the relevant political institution and the percentage they said they would ideally like to see. Of the 1,088 respondents who answered both questions in Argentina, for instance, 39 said that their ideal legislature included at least 10 percentage points fewer workers than what they believed the Chamber of Deputies currently had ("too many workers" in Figure 3), 111 said that their ideal was within 10 percentage points above or below what they believed the status quo was ("about enough workers"), and 911 respondents said that their ideal was more than 10 percentage points higher than the status quo ("too few workers").

Figure 3 plots how respondents in each group answered several questions about their political behavior that were available in our survey datasets, including items that asked about attending labor union or political meetings, attending street protests (Argentina and Britain),

20

doing work for a campaign (US), viewing government corruption as the most important problem facing the country (Argentina), disapproving of the way the national legislature is doing its job (US), voting for FPV candidate Daniel Scioli in 2015 (Argentina), and voting for Republican candidate Donald Trump in 2016 (US).

[Figure 3 about here]

If people care about the numerical underrepresentation of the working class, respondents who believe it is far lower than their ideal should think, vote, or otherwise behave differently in some measureable way. In these three samples, however, they did not. In all three countries, respondents who thought there were far too few workers were about as likely as those who thought there were too many workers to attend union meetings and political rallies. They were no more likely to take to the streets in protest (Argentina and Britain) or work for a campaign or candidate (US). They were no more likely to say that government corruption was the most important problem facing the country (Argentina) or to disapprove of Congress (US). Those who thought there were far too few workers in office were no more likely than those who thought there were too many to vote for Scioli (Argentina), and they were slightly *more* likely to vote for the billionaire Trump (US), although the difference was not statistically significant in follow-up regression models. Simply put, we did not find any evidence of a meaningful relationship between the gap between respondents' views and ideals about the representation of the working class and anything else respondents engaged in politically. Even the citizens who felt there was an enormous gulf between the status quo and the ideal representation of workers did not behave differently in any ways that we could measure. Voters may care that workers are underrepresented among officeholders, but they do not seem to care enough to do anything about it.

Follow-up regression models reached the same basic conclusion. Table 2 reports ordinary least squares models that relate the outcome variables in Figure 3 (e.g., whether the respondent had attended a protest) to a continuous measure of the percentage-point difference between the percentage of working-class people the respondent believed was in the legislature and the percentage they would like to be in an ideal Chamber of Deputies (with higher values signifying a desire for more workers than the perceived status quo). The models also controlled for ideology, political knowledge, household wealth/income, education, age, and gender.

[Table 2 about here]

The findings reported in Table 2 were in line with what we observed in Figure 3: even with a robust set of controls, we did not find any evidence of a relationship between reported demand for more working-class representation and political attitudes or behaviors. Citizens in Argentina, Britain, and the US consistently underestimate the shortage of workers in public office—though they realize that there is a substantial gap—and even those who want more workers to govern do not seem to be doing anything about it.

Blinded by Wealth?

Politicians the world over are vastly better off than the people who elect them. Could that be because voters do not know—or do not care—that so few lower-income and working-class people go on to hold public office?

The general trajectory of the recent literature on the causes of government by the privileged suggests that there may be significant structural barriers to working-class representation. To date, however, prior studies have only uncovered variables that predict marginal differences.

22

This study provides the first evidence of a structural impediment to working-class representation. In democracies, major reforms usually require energetic public support (e.g., Kingdon [1984] 2011). But when a problem is hard to understand—like economic inequality—it is harder for reformers and politicians to address. The evidence in this paper suggests that the numerical underrepresentation of the working class may be one such problem. In Argentina, Britain, and the US—three countries where politicians are vastly better off than ordinary citizens—voters significantly underestimate the economic gulf between them and their leaders. Moreover, even voters who say they want greater working-class representation do not seem to place much importance on it: they think, vote, and behave about the same as other citizens. These findings suggest that one reason why the world's electoral democracies are run by the very privileged may simply be that voters do not know and do not care.

Voters in these three countries do seem to know that there is a large gap between the social class makeup of the electorate and class backgrounds of legislators (although they consistently underestimate that gap), and they seem to want the social class makeup of their legislatures to look more like the electorate. Why are political parties not anticipating these preferences and fielding working-class candidates? One possibility is that voters' preferences about this are relatively weak; indeed, voters seem to be doing very little about the gap between their preferences and reality. Another possibility is that parties weigh other factors more heavily when recruiting candidates—factors like the ability to raise money and take time off to campaign that are likely to be higher among more affluent candidates.

Of course, this study has several important limitations. Our analysis has focused on just three countries. These are the first data ever collected on public views and opinions about the aggregate numerical representation of the working class, and obviously follow-up studies in

other countries are still needed. Moreover, this analysis has focused on whether the public knows or cares about working-class representation, not on *why*. There are many potential mechanisms that may help to explain why citizens underestimate the extent of government by the privileged—general inattention, poormouthing by elites, and so on—or why citizens do not seem too concerned about it—rival narratives, other more pressing problems, confusion about policy solutions, and so on. These mechanisms deserve more careful attention than we have been able to give them here.

Even so, these findings have important implications for scholars of descriptive representation—and for activists and reformers interested in increasing the representation of the working class. If the publics in Argentina, Britain, and the US are any indication, simply spreading the word about government by the privileged may not be enough to generate grassroots pressure for reform. Even voters who prefer a government that resembles the social class makeup of the people it represents—and who realize that workers currently hold office in far smaller numbers—do not appear willing to do much about it. If reformers wish to increase the representation of the working class, they will need to be serious about the limits to how much voters know about government by the privileged, and how much they care. Reformers will likely have to find a way to get the public to care about working-class representation—or find a way to enact reforms that do not depend on vigorous grassroots support.

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Figure 1: What Voters Think about the Descriptive Representation of Workers and Women

Argentina

Britain

US

*Sources*: APES (2015), YouGov UK (2016), CCES (2016).

Figure 2: Misperceptions about Working-Class Representation Are Widespread

Argentina

Britain

US

Sources: APES (2015), YouGov UK (2016), CCES (2016).

Figure 3: People Who Believe Workers Are Underrepresented Don't Behave Differently

Argentina

Britain

US

Sources: APES (2015), YouGov UK (2016), CCES (2016).

Table 1: Class and Politics in Argentina, Britain, and the US

	Argentina	Britain	US
Worker representation			
Working-class proportion of adult population	73	50	54
Proportion of national legislators drawn from working class	5	4	2
Political variables			
Years of democracy (since 1800)	35	131	206
Political system	Presidential	Parliamentary	Presidential
Electoral system	Proportional	Majoritarian	Majoritarian
Average district magnitude, lower house	10.7	1	1
Legislative fractionalization	0.77	0.62	0.49
Candidate selection	Mixed[†]	Party	Open primary
Quotas for elected office	Women (30%)	None	None
Economic context			
Economic development (ranking)	51	23	11
Human Development Index (ranking)	40	14	8
Unionization rate	28.9	25.4	10.8

Sources: Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Cracknell and McGuinness 2010; Database of Political Institutions; International Labour Organization; Office of National Statistics 2012; OECD; Polity IV; United Nations Development Programme.

Notes: Years of democracy is measured as the total number of years with a Polity score greater than 5. Some of the figures for Britain refer to the entire United Kingdom.

[†] Since 2009, Argentina has held mandatory primary elections. Primary candidates for executive offices appear individually, but legislative primaries are contested by competing lists drawn up by party officials.

Table 2: The Relationship between Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (from Regression Models with Controls)

Argentina *controls:* ideology, political knowledge, wealth, education, age, gender	Political/union meeting attendance 0.03 (0.04)	Protest participation -0.06* (0.03)	Vote for Scioli 0.07 (0.05)	Corruption is top problem 0.02 (0.04)
Britain *controls:* ideology, political knowledge, income, education, age, gender	Political/union meeting attendance 0.05 (0.03)	Protest participation 0.02 (0.01)		
US *controls:* ideology, political knowledge, income, education, age, gender	Political meeting attendance -0.01 (0.05)	Work for campaign or candidate 0.02 (0.03)	Vote for Trump 0.04 (0.06)	Disapprove of Congress 0.01 (0.05)

Sources: APES (2015), YouGov UK (2016), CCES (2016).

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses) relating the political behavior variable in question to the difference between the proportion of workers the respondent said should ideally hold office and the proportion they said they believed held office on the left-hand side (which had a range of -1 to 1) as well as the controls listed. Complete model results are listed in Tables A7, A8, and A9 in the online appendix.

$^*p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Online Appendix for "Blinded by Wealth? What Voters Think About the Descriptive Underrepresentation of the Working Class"

<u>**Survey Question Wording**</u>

Argentina:

Preface: "We want to talk about the working class—people who do manual work or provide services, such as factory workers, maids, or servants."

Workers in the general public: "If you had to guess, what percentage of the population in Argentina would you say belongs to the working class?"

Workers in the legislature: "If you had to guess, what percentage of National Deputies would you say come from the working class?"

Ideal workers in the legislature: "In an ideal world, what percentage of National Deputies would you like to come from the working class?"

Women in the general public: "If you had to guess, what percentage of the population in Argentina would you say are women?"

Women in the legislature: "If you had to guess, what percentage of National Deputies would you say are women?"

Ideal women in the legislature: "In an ideal world, what percentage of National Deputies would you like to be women?"

Political knowledge: "(a) Do you remember which candidate came in second place in the general presidential election of 2011? (1) Ricardo Alfonsín; (2) Hermes Binner; (3) Eduardo Duhalde; (4) Alberto Rodríguez Saá. (b) Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations? (1) Kofi Annan; (2) Kurt Waldheim; (3) Ban Ki-Moon; (4) Boutros Boutros-Ghali. (c) Counting the City of Buenos Aires as a province, how many provinces are there in the Republic of Argentina? (1) 21; (2) 22; (3) 23; (4) 24. (d) Who is the country's Minister of the Economy? (1) Jorge Capitanich; (2) Axel Kicillof; (3) Héctor Timerman; (4) Florencio Randazzo. (e) Who is the current president of Brazil? (1) Lula Da Silva; (2) Dilma Rousseff; (3) Michelle Bachelet; (4) Fernando Henrique Cardoso." Factored index of correct responses.[10]

Occupation: "What is/was your primary occupation?"

Partisanship: "Independent of who you voted for in the last election or who you plan to vote for in the next one, in general, do you identify with a particular political party? With what party?" (1) Peronism; (2) Front for Victory (FPV); (3) Republican Proposal (PRO); (4) UNA Front; (5) Radicalism; (6) Progressives; (7) Other.

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[10] Cronbach's α = 0.68. Factor loadings are a=0.57, b=0.42, c=0.63, d=0.80, e=0.81.

Attend union or political meetings: "Now I am going to read to you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me whether you attend the meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never." Binary variable coded (1) if respondent reported some attendance at "meetings of a labor union" or "meetings of a political party or movement" and (0) if respondent never attends either.

Attend protests: "During the last 12 months, have you participated in any of the following activities? Marches, demonstrations, or public protests." (1) Yes; (0) No.

Corruption as most important problem: "In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the country?" Open-ended, enumerator coded.

Vote choice in 2015: "And who did you vote for in the presidential elections on October 25?" (1) Daniel Scioli; (2) Mauricio Macri; (3) Sergio Massa; (4) Margarita Stolbizer; (5) Adolfo Rodriguez Saá; (6) Nicolás Del Caño; (7) Other; (8) Blank/null; (9) Did not vote. Binary variable coded (1) for Daniel Scioli and (0) for all others.

Ideology: "In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and 'right.' Using a scale where 0 means left and 10 means right, where would you place yourself?"

Wealth: "Please tell me if you have the following items in your household: (a) Refrigerator with freezer, (b) Landline telephone, (c) Cellular telephone, (d) Car, (e) Washing machine, (f) Motorcycle, (g) Computer, (h) Internet, (i) Flat screen TV, (j) Plumbed gas." (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.[11]

Britain:

Preface: "Now we want to talk about the working class—people who do manual labour work (like factory or construction workers), service industry work (like custodians or restaurant servers), and clerical work (like receptionists)."

Workers in the general public: "If you had to guess, what percentage of the labour force in the UK would you estimate is employed in working-class jobs? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Workers in the legislature: "If you had to guess, what percentage of Members of Parliament do you think come from the working class? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Ideal workers in the legislature: "Some people think that more politicians should come from working-class jobs. Others think more should come from white-collar professions. In an ideal world, what percentage of Members of Parliament would you want to come from the working class?"

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[11] In constructing this index, we follow a common practice in household surveys of using the first principal component as an index of asset wealth (see Filmer and Pritchett 2001).

Women in the general public: "If you had to guess, what percentage of the labour force in the UK would you estimate are female? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Women in the legislature: "If you had to guess, what percentage of Members of Parliament do you think are female? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Ideal women in the legislature: "Some people think there should be more women in Parliament. Others think it does not matter how many Members of Parliament are women. In an ideal world, what percentage of Members of Parliament would you want to be women?"

Political knowledge: "Please tell me if you think that the following statements are true or false. If you don't know, just say so and we will skip to the next one. (a) Polling stations close at 10.00pm on election day. (b) No-one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit? (c) Only taxpayers are allowed to vote in a general election. (d) The Liberal Democrats favour a system of proportional representation for Westminster elections. (e) MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees?" Factored index of correct responses.[12]

Partisanship: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?" (1) Conservative; (2) Labour; (3) Liberal Democrat; (4) Scottish National Party (SNP); (5) Plaid Cymru; (6) United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP); (7) Green Party; (8) British National Party (BNP); (9) Other party.

Attend union or political meetings: "Do you attend meetings of a political party or political organization at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never? Do you attend meetings of a trade union at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never?" Binary variable coded (1) if respondent reported some attendance at either and (0) if respondent never attends either.

Attend protests: "In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?"

Ideology: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?" (0-10 scale)

US:

Preface: "We want to talk about the working class—people who do manual labor work (like factory or construction workers), service industry work (like custodians or restaurant servers), and clerical work (like receptionists)."

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[12] Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.72$. Factor loadings are a=0.56, b=0.73, c=0.63, d=0.77, e=0.73.

Workers in the general public: "If you had to guess, what percentage of the workforce in US would you estimate is employed in working-class jobs? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Workers in the legislature: "If you had to guess, what percentage of [members of Congress / state legislators in your state / the people on your town's city council] do you think come from the working class? (Please don't bother looking it up: we're just interested in your best guess.)"

Ideal workers in the legislature: "Some people think that more politicians should come from working-class jobs. Others think more should come from white-collar professions. In an ideal world, what percentage of [members of Congress / state legislators in your state / the people on your town's city council] would you want to come from the working class?"

Political knowledge: "Which party has a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives?" (1) Republicans; (2) Democrats; (3) Neither; (4) Not sure. "Which party has a majority of seats in the U.S. Senate?" (1) Republicans; (2) Democrats; (3) Neither; (4) Not sure. Coded (0) if both answers incorrect, (1) if one answer is correct, and (2) if both answers are correct.

Partisanship: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or other?"

Attend political meetings: "During the past year, did you attend local political meetings (such as school board or city council)?" (1) Yes; (0) No.

Work for candidate/campaign: "During the past year, did you work for a candidate or campaign?" (1) Yes; (0) No.

Approval of Congress: "Do you approve of the way Congress is doing its job?" (1) Strongly approve, (2) Somewhat approve, (3) Somewhat disapprove, (4) Strongly disapprove. Binary variable coded (1) for "strongly approve" or somewhat approve" and (0) for "strongly disapprove" and "somewhat disapprove."

Vote choice: "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?" (1) Donald Trump (Republican); (2) Hillary Clinton (Democrat); (3) Gary Johnson (Libertarian); (4) Jill Stein (Green); (5) Other; (6) I didn't vote in this election; (7) I'm not sure; (8) Evan McMullin (Independent). Binary variable coded (1) Donald Trump and (0) all else.

Ideology: "How would you rate each of the following individuals? Yourself:" (1) Very liberal; (2) Liberal; (3) Somewhat liberal; (4) Middle of the road; (5) Somewhat conservative; (6) Conservative; (7) Very conservative.

Table A1: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (Argentina)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
Public-Leg-Ideal	-0.30	5.06**	2.76	-0.17	2.16	4.64
	(1.24)	(1.58)	(1.96)	(2.31)	(2.02)	(2.82)
Public-Ideal-Leg	0.59	2.23	0.58	-2.10	0.34	-2.05
	(1.30)	(1.66)	(2.13)	(2.52)	(2.63)	(3.00)
Leg-Public-Ideal	0.37	2.52	0.46	-2.36	-0.13	4.09
	(1.46)	(1.65)	(2.12)	(2.64)	(2.22)	(3.09)
Leg-Ideal-Public	-0.26	2.44	-0.21	-3.17	-2.36	2.81
	(1.33)	(1.73)	(1.83)	(2.47)	(2.09)	(2.96)
Ideal-Public-Leg	-0.32	2.08	-1.24	-8.25**	3.80	-1.13
	(1.43)	(1.60)	(2.03)	(2.72)	(2.37)	(3.07)
Ideal-Leg-Public (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Intercept	57.56**	22.04**	46.99**	61.27**	19.27**	62.77**
	(0.97)	(1.14)	(1.60)	(1.76)	(1.40)	(1.94)
N	1,208	1,073	1,214	1,208	1,108	1,229
R^2	0.001	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.009	0.009

Source: APES (2015).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^*p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A2: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (Britain, Women Block First)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
pub-leg-ideal-imp	7.60*	2.00	-0.36	1.92	-0.97	-1.08
	(3.86)	(3.50)	(3.32)	(5.03)	(3.27)	(6.76)
leg-pub-ideal-imp	3.17	3.80	-2.69	-5.73	2.14	-4.15
	(4.82)	(3.57)	(4.12)	(5.65)	(4.91)	(6.54)
ideal-leg-imp-pub	7.91*	0.43	-2.48	-6.16	-1.35	-2.91
	(3.73)	(3.84)	(2.71)	(5.81)	(3.61)	(6.40)
ideal-pub-imp-leg	4.34	-0.14	-1.54	-15.04*	-3.36	-10.75
	(3.95)	(3.55)	(3.23)	(7.20)	(3.41)	(6.20)
pub-imp-ideal-leg	10.26**	2.37	-4.07	3.53	0.73	-5.08
	(3.21)	(3.44)	(2.84)	(5.38)	(3.79)	(6.27)
leg-imp-ideal-pub	9.76*	7.85*	-0.34	1.26	-0.51	-2.06
	(3.82)	(3.46)	(2.36)	(5.93)	(3.78)	(6.16)
pub-imp-leg-ideal	10.28**	0.24	-3.27	-0.43	-0.32	-5.71
	(3.49)	(3.35)	(2.66)	(5.36)	(4.10)	(6.79)
leg-imp-pub-ideal	2.29	7.85*	-3.68	-18.58**	0.94	-7.90
	(3.61)	(3.56)	(3.13)	(5.73)	(4.36)	(7.20)
ideal-imp-pub-leg	6.35	2.79	-1.37	-7.13	-0.10	-1.41
	(4.32)	(3.24)	(2.91)	(5.34)	(3.64)	(6.62)
ideal-imp-leg-pub	5.79	1.32	1.36	-2.66	8.10	-8.49
	(4.64)	(3.97)	(2.91)	(4.84)	(4.90)	(5.91)
imp-leg-ideal-pub	2.86	3.09	-1.35	-2.73	0.89	-3.02
	(4.20)	(3.41)	(2.70)	(5.04)	(3.44)	(5.83)
imp-pub-ideal-leg	6.43	3.86	-1.49	-19.37**	0.44	1.03
	(3.80)	(3.34)	(2.92)	(6.30)	(3.60)	(7.06)
pub-ideal-leg-imp	6.40	3.56	0.80	-1.85	1.35	0.63
	(4.13)	(4.17)	(3.44)	(4.68)	(4.35)	(5.84)
imp-ideal-leg-pub	1.18	-2.19	-6.87	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted

	(4.43)	(3.56)	(4.11)			
imp-ideal-pub-leg	7.39	4.69	-0.91	-6.71	3.88	-0.91
	(4.35)	(3.47)	(2.76)	(5.32)	(3.53)	(6.06)
imp-leg-pub-ideal	2.40	-0.92	-8.49*	2.41	-0.92	2.34
	(4.25)	(3.61)	(3.64)	(4.65)	(3.45)	(6.06)
imp-pub-leg-ideal	8.51*	5.70	-4.88	-15.36*	-4.11	-5.79
	(3.39)	(3.18)	(3.05)	(6.70)	(3.48)	(7.55)
leg-ideal-pub-imp	8.02*	2.32	-4.27	-1.15	2.82	0.82
	(3.63)	(3.52)	(3.01)	(4.90)	(3.44)	(6.22)
ideal-leg-pub-imp	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	-14.71*	-2.76	-0.24
				(6.54)	(3.89)	(7.22)
ideal-pub-leg-imp	1.11	-5.00	-6.81	-11.39*	-3.53	-3.94
	(4.07)	(3.42)	(3.79)	(5.33)	(3.33)	(7.15)
pub-leg-imp-ideal	9.37**	6.98	-1.93	0.53	0.52	-5.57
	(3.53)	(3.76)	(2.71)	(5.39)	(3.85)	(6.32)
leg-pub-imp-ideal	7.62	6.54	-3.12	-0.53	-5.92	-1.44
	(4.25)	(3.53)	(3.06)	(7.08)	(3.46)	(6.53)
pub-ideal-imp-leg	8.44*	3.88	-2.82	1.51	-6.94*	5.54
	(3.75)	(3.37)	(2.50)	(6.14)	(3.35)	(7.02)
leg-ideal-imp-pub	6.84	5.74	2.82	-7.77	-1.57	-2.76
	(3.50)	(3.50)	(2.66)	(5.12)	(4.31)	(6.33)
Intercept	35.69***	22.14***	47.35***	53.72***	18.93***	47.15***
	(3.02)	(2.82)	(1.90)	(3.61)	(2.71)	(5.08)
N	775	777	751	770	772	763
R^2	0.049	0.067	0.039	0.087	0.050	0.028

Source: YouGov UK (2016).

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A3: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (Britain, Workers Block First)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
pub-leg-ideal-imp	Omitted	Omitted	1.37 (4.53)	10.16 (6.40)	-3.76 (4.64)	0.93 (5.76)
leg-pub-ideal-imp	5.79 (4.14)	5.06 (4.06)	4.55 (4.12)	6.49 (6.66)	-1.37 (4.58)	0.98 (5.87)
ideal-leg-imp-pub	3.02 (3.78)	-0.77 (3.59)	-3.79 (4.30)	12.41 (7.19)	-5.65 (4.69)	6.74 (5.89)
ideal-pub-imp-leg	0.83 (4.39)	0.95 (3.67)	1.83 (3.89)	11.57 (7.66)	3.15 (5.85)	2.50 (7.17)
pub-imp-ideal-leg	3.03 (3.67)	-2.02 (3.43)	4.55 (3.98)	8.22 (7.07)	3.08 (5.70)	Omitted
leg-imp-ideal-pub	6.83 (4.19)	1.83 (3.62)	0.96 (4.21)	-1.02 (8.03)	-2.71 (4.98)	-6.65 (6.20)
pub-imp-leg-ideal	6.64 (4.31)	3.00 (3.60)	1.66 (4.05)	9.56 (6.66)	-2.97 (5.08)	-2.61 (5.30)
leg-imp-pub-ideal	5.67 (3.66)	1.85 (3.51)	-2.60 (4.69)	5.76 (6.96)	-2.01 (4.66)	-1.71 (5.80)
ideal-imp-pub-leg	3.46 (3.51)	2.55 (3.88)	0.84 (3.93)	Omitted	Omitted	-0.72 (6.69)
ideal-imp-leg-pub	5.26 (4.37)	1.25 (3.50)	0.32 (4.13)	5.55 (6.50)	-1.28 (5.33)	2.28 (5.57)
imp-leg-ideal-pub	1.46 (4.17)	-0.39 (3.48)	-1.87 (4.20)	10.36 (6.57)	4.79 (5.16)	1.81 (5.45)
imp-pub-ideal-leg	8.02* (3.74)	-0.51 (3.46)	0.02 (3.88)	4.45 (7.23)	-4.28 (4.76)	-5.02 (6.15)
pub-ideal-leg-imp	-2.81 (4.39)	-0.32 (3.71)	Omitted	11.49 (6.97)	0.92 (5.72)	4.40 (5.71)
imp-ideal-leg-pub	0.35	-4.83	-3.04	6.95	-0.02	2.70

	(4.35)	(3.46)	(4.56)	(7.25)	(5.23)	(6.46)
imp-ideal-pub-leg	8.90*	1.41	-0.47	0.89	-0.14	-0.51
	(3.88)	(3.74)	(4.04)	(8.01)	(6.65)	(6.35)
imp-leg-pub-ideal	4.20	-3.97	2.98	12.91	-1.13	-7.66
	(3.86)	(4.21)	(4.02)	(7.10)	(4.84)	(5.49)
imp-pub-leg-ideal	2.98	-1.28	-2.04	4.96	-5.50	-3.01
	(3.87)	(3.66)	(4.19)	(6.82)	(4.98)	(6.65)
leg-ideal-pub-imp	12.10**	-3.02	2.56	12.31	3.94	3.52
	(4.17)	(3.69)	(4.06)	(6.84)	(5.66)	(5.95)
ideal-leg-pub-imp	5.28	4.54	-0.78	9.22	-2.78	3.78
	(3.79)	(3.73)	(4.44)	(6.88)	(4.98)	(6.36)
ideal-pub-leg-imp	3.58	-1.83	1.14	7.22	-3.71	0.30
	(3.79)	(3.86)	(4.13)	(7.01)	(4.46)	(6.04)
pub-leg-imp-ideal	8.63*	7.57	2.74	10.55	-0.24	-3.02
	(4.35)	(5.20)	(4.40)	(6.56)	(5.10)	(5.49)
leg-pub-imp-ideal	7.12	-0.63	-3.58	12.26	3.79	4.11
	(3.79)	(4.06)	(4.76)	(6.42)	(6.36)	(6.28)
pub-ideal-imp-leg	6.13	-0.73	4.11	11.90	-1.90	0.25
	(4.03)	(3.51)	(3.74)	(6.66)	(5.06)	(6.15)
leg-ideal-imp-pub	2.12	1.99	-2.60	18.94**	2.00	-2.85
	(4.33)	(3.75)	(4.69)	(7.01)	(5.39)	(5.70)
Intercept	35.57***	23.52***	43.29***	41.32***	19.42***	45.19***
	(2.99)	(3.05)	(3.44)	(5.92)	(4.18)	(4.76)
N	829	837	822	840	841	838
R^2	0.044	0.053	0.033	0.043	0.031	0.031

Source: YouGov UK (2016).

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A4: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Question Order (US)

	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order			
Public-Leg-Ideal (omitted)	---	---	---
Public-Ideal-Leg	-3.95	-6.66	-5.96
	(2.29)	(3.48)	(3.22)
Leg-Public-Ideal	0.12	0.64	-1.54
	(2.91)	(4.13)	(3.94)
Leg-Ideal-Public	-0.65	-1.22	-0.19
	(2.63)	(4.16)	(3.36)
Ideal-Public-Leg	-5.99	-4.92	-1.36
	(3.64)	(3.87)	(3.82)
Ideal-Leg-Public	-5.63	-8.83*	-1.96
	(3.12)	(3.65)	(3.27)
Intercept	60.96***	31.66***	59.16***
	(1.60)	(2.61)	(2.26)
N	993	987	990
R^2	0.015	0.019	0.006

Source: CCES (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A5: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Block Order (Britain)

	Women Public	Women Leg.	Women Ideal	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order						
Women Block First	1.10	-0.11	0.76	-1.36	-0.89	-1.42
	(1.21)	(0.87)	(1.13)	(0.78)	(0.66)	(0.74)
Worker Block First (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Intercept	48.73***	18.66***	44.50***	41.74***	25.06***	44.96***
	(0.93)	(0.58)	(0.84)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.52)
N	1,610	1,613	1,601	1,604	1,614	1,573
R^2	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.003

Source: YouGov UK (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^*p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A6: Models Relating Voter Estimates to Level of Office (US)

	Workers Public	Workers Leg.	Workers Ideal
Question Order			
Congress	---	---	---
State Legislature	-4.92*	4.85*	-3.99
	(2.49)	(2.47)	(2.66)
City Council	1.91	24.04***	1.23
	(1.92)	(2.70)	(2.63)
	59.47***	19.17***	58.41***
Intercept	(1.40)	(1.60)	(2.00)
N	993	987	990
*R*²	0.019	0.153	0.008

Source: CCES (2016).
Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A7: Regression Models from Table 2, Relating Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (Argentina)

Dependent variable	Perceived worker underrepresentation	Political/union meeting attendance	Protest participation	Vote for Scioli	Corruption is top problem
Perceived worker underrepresentation	--	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Ideology	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Political knowledge	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Household wealth	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
Intercept	0.56*** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.85*** (0.11)	-0.16* (0.07)
N	1,022	1,022	1,021	922	1,021
R^2	0.014	0.028	0.050	0.060	0.036

Source: APES (2015).

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^*p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A8: Regression Models from Table 2, Relating Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (Britain)

Dependent variable	Perceived worker underrepresentation	Political/union meeting attendance	Protest participation
Perceived worker Underrepresentation	--	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)
Ideology	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Political knowledge	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Household income	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.02 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Intercept	0.23*** (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)	0.12*** (0.03)
N	1415	1360	1376
R^2	0.046	0.050	0.041

Source: YouGov UK (2016).

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^*p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A9: Regression Models from Table 2, Relating Perceived Worker Underrepresentation and Political Behavior (US)

Dependent variable	Perceived worker under-rep	Political meeting attendance	Work for campaign or candidate	Vote for Trump	Disapprove of Congress
Perceived worker underrepresentation	--	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Ideology	0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)
Political knowledge	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)	0.15** (0.05)
Household income	0.09 (0.07)	0.16** (0.06)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.11 (0.13)	0.12 (0.11)
Education	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.11)
Birth year	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Female	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Intercept	0.68 (1.06)	-1.35 (1.58)	0.11 (1.35)	5.84** (1.96)	13.49** (1.72)
N	931	779	779	745	930
R^2	0.042	0.070	0.051	0.362	0.220

Source: CCES (2016)

Notes: Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses). $^*p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$, two tailed.

References

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