


Supporting Information for “Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America”

Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu

Figure A1: The Class Distributions of Argentine Legislators in the USAL Survey and the Directorio Legislativo Dataset



Sources: USAL survey and Directorio Legislativo data.

Table A1: Occupational Coding for LAPOP Data

Broad Category	Narrow Category
Businesspeople and professionals	Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician, engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.) Manager Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist, athlete, etc.) Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.) Artisan
Workers	Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.) Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative, etc.) Food vendor Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver, etc.) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land) Domestic servant Servant

Table A2: Occupational Coding for USAL, ILO, and Directorio Legislativo Data

Broad Category	Narrow Category
Businessperson	Associate Director / CEO Business owner / manager Farmer, Farm owner / manager Banker Contractor Salesman Business representative
Private-sector Professional	Accountant / Economist Actor Advertising Architect / Urban Planner Author Consultant Doctor / Dentist / Vet Engineer Hospital Administrator Journalist / Publisher Medical Office Manager Mortician Pharmacist Professional Athlete Radio and Television Notary Public
Military / Law Enforcement	Military Law Enforcement
Lawyer	Lawyer
Politician	Political Consultant Political Party Officer Pub Policy Analyst Public Relations / Lobbyist Judge Mayor Government Attorney

(continued)

Broad Occupational Category	Narrow Occupational Category
Service-based Professional	NGO / Charity Organizer College Administrator College Professor Education Admin. Guidance Councilor High School Admin. Librarian Minister / Priest Sec. School Teacher Social Worker Other educator Nurse Community organizer
Worker	Laborer Service industry worker Union officer, staff member
No info	Student Retiree Housewife Unemployed

Table A3: Replicating State Functions Analysis (with Controls) in Table 1 using Alternative Dependent Variables

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	% little / none	% a lot	price control	free prim. ed.	free sec. ed.	free coll. ed.	public hous.	guar. empl.	social sec.	evn. regs.	unem. insur.	basic needs prov.
Businessperson	5.50** (1.73)	-4.83 ⁺ (2.59)	0.17* (0.09)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)	0.25** (0.09)	0.23** (0.07)	0.16 ⁺ (0.09)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.14 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)
Private-sector Professional	5.24** (1.76)	-3.63 (2.63)	0.18* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.11 ⁺ (0.06)	0.35** (0.09)	0.12 ⁺ (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	0.14 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)
Military / Law Enforcement	7.03 (4.87)	-1.64 (7.30)	0.24 (0.25)	0.03 (0.11)	0.07 (0.17)	0.65** (0.25)	0.11 (0.20)	0.07 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.14 (0.24)	0.12 (0.25)
Lawyer	6.90**	-5.28 ⁺	0.18 ⁺	-0.01	0.15*	0.39**	0.15 ⁺	0.09	0.09	0.09 ⁺	0.21*	0.00

	(1.99)	(2.98)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Politician	5.41**	-3.76	0.21*	-0.03	0.02	0.35**	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.07	0.14	-0.09
	(1.88)	(2.82)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Service-based Professional	4.15*	-0.87	0.10	-0.10*	-0.03	0.27**	0.13	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.01
	(2.06)	(3.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Worker (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	1326	1326	1323	1326	1325	1320	1325	1312	1321	1321	1305	1314
<i>R</i> ²	0.1468	0.1257	0.2718	0.1158	0.0829	0.1053	0.1464	0.1378	0.0783	0.0800	0.1512	0.0817
St. Err.	17.623	26.408	0.8924	19.498	.61736	.89749	.72889	.90767	.65653	.4523	.87081	.89243

Source: USAL surveys.

Notes: Cells report coefficients from regressions relating the percentage of 10 state functions legislators said they would prefer the government to engage in “a little” or “not at all” (first model), the percentage each legislator wanted the government to engage in “a lot” (second model), or their score on the underlying four-point scale on each individual government function (remaining models) to occupational indicators and controls for party, country, religion, gender, age, and marital status. Coefficients for the control variables and the “no info” occupation are omitted but available on request.

⁺ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A4: Replicating Social Spending Analysis (with Controls) in Table 1 using Alternative Dependent Variables

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	% same / less	% more	infrast.	health & soc. sec.	public safety	ed.	unemp.	housing	pensions
Businessperson	5.14** (1.91)	-5.14** (1.91)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.08* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.03)	0.19* (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	0.16* (0.07)
Private-sector Professional	3.75+ (1.94)	-3.75+ (1.94)	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.19* (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.14* (0.07)
Military / Law Enforcement	6.80 (5.39)	-6.80 (5.39)	0.82** (0.18)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.24)	0.31+ (0.16)	0.30 (0.20)
Lawyer	3.61 (2.20)	-3.61 (2.20)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18+ (0.09)	0.01 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)

Politician	3.34	-3.34	-0.06	0.06+	-0.05	0.02	0.16+	-0.01	0.14+
	(2.08)	(2.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Service-based Professional	4.83*	-4.83*	0.07	0.08*	-0.06	0.02	0.23*	-0.04	0.12
	(2.28)	(2.28)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Worker (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	1326	1326	1312	1313	1316	1316	1248	1313	1299
<i>R</i> ²	0.1158	0.1158	0.1169	0.1427	0.1340	0.1069	0.1099	0.1378	0.0911
St. Err.	19.498	19.498	0.6464	0.34308	0.51703	0.26615	0.79789	0.90767	0.72616

Source: USAL surveys.

Notes: Cells report coefficients from regressions relating the percentage of seven social programs legislators said they would prefer the government to spend “the same” or “less” on (first model), the percentage each legislator wanted the government to spend “more” on (second model), or their score on a three-point scale (more, the same, less) on each individual social program (remaining models) to occupational indicators and controls for party, country, religion, gender, age, and marital status. Coefficients for the control variables

and the “no info” occupation are omitted but available on request.

⁺ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed.

Table A5: Regression Models Relating Class and Latin American Legislators' Economic Attitudes (with Control Variables Displayed)

Dependent Variable Controls?	State Functions		Social Spending	
	No	Yes	No	Yes
Businessperson	7.52** (2.22)	5.50** (1.73)	7.59** (2.77)	5.14** (1.91)
Private-sector Professional	7.60** (2.25)	5.24** (1.76)	8.24** (2.80)	3.75+ (1.94)
Military / Law Enforcement	7.53 (6.31)	7.03 (4.87)	8.65 (7.86)	6.80 (5.39)
Lawyer	8.74** (2.50)	6.90** (1.99)	8.80** (3.11)	3.61 (2.20)
Politician	7.75** (2.35)	5.41** (1.88)	7.79** (2.92)	3.34 (2.08)
Service-based Professional	9.79** (2.54)	4.15* (2.06)	11.42** (3.16)	4.83* (2.28)
Worker (omitted)	---	---	---	---
Party Ideology (1 to 9)	---	3.57** (0.42)	---	2.22** (0.46)
Catholic	---	10.03* (5.04)	---	-6.00 (5.57)
Other Religion	---	10.06+ (5.27)	---	-7.99 (5.83)
Non believer	---	6.38 (5.21)	---	-7.83 (5.76)
Atheist	---	1.34 (5.57)	---	-12.61* (6.16)
No religion given (omitted)	---	---	---	---
Never attends church	---	-2.32 (3.13)	---	-1.12 (3.46)
Attends several times a year	---	-5.88+ (3.35)	---	-4.22 (3.71)
Attends a few times a month	---	-4.50 (3.39)	---	-3.60 (3.75)

Attends most Sundays and holidays	---	-4.78 (3.37)	---	-2.76 (3.73)
Attends several times a week	---	-8.88* (4.23)	---	-5.55 (4.68)
No church attendance given (omitted)	---	---	---	---
Male	---	1.07 (1.52)	---	-1.91 (1.69)
Female (omitted)	---	---	---	---
Age (24 to 85)	---	-0.15** (0.06)	---	-0.20** (0.06)
Single	---	10.78 (10.24)	---	4.11 (11.33)
Married	---	14.10 (10.08)	---	4.28 (11.15)
Divorced	---	14.68 (10.20)	---	3.32 (11.28)
Widowed	---	7.82 (10.62)	---	1.75 (11.75)
Marital status not given (omitted)	---	---	---	---
Mexico	---	-2.31 (2.92)	---	-15.69** (3.23)
Chile	---	-0.27 (2.95)	---	-9.44** (3.26)
Argentina	---	-2.58 (2.86)	---	-7.76* (3.16)
El Salvador	---	-3.44 (2.89)	---	-10.58** (3.20)
Bolivia	---	-5.46+ (2.90)	---	-12.56** (3.21)
Honduras	---	-3.33 (2.96)	---	-22.36** (3.27)
Colombia	---	-13.51** (2.86)	---	-22.82** (3.17)
Costa Rica	---	-6.72* (2.89)	---	-14.95** (3.20)

Nicaragua	---	-4.93 ⁺ (2.89)	---	-19.76** (3.20)
Guatemala	---	1.72 (2.94)	---	-16.58** (3.25)
Paraguay	---	-5.68 ⁺ (2.90)	---	-15.62** (3.21)
Ecuador	---	-5.77* (2.89)	---	-19.91** (3.20)
Dominican Republic	---	-12.60** (2.93)	---	-19.89** (3.24)
Peru	---	-0.01 (2.98)	---	-11.48** (3.30)
Venezuela	---	0.81 (2.86)	---	-23.08** (3.17)
Uruguay (omitted)	---	---	---	---
Intercept	19.59** (1.80)	-10.17 (12.24)	19.43** (2.24)	35.02* (13.54)
<i>N</i>	1569	1326	1569	1326
<i>R</i> ²	0.0127	0.1468	0.0095	0.1158
St. Err.	24.597	17.623	0.0095	19.498

Source: USAL surveys.

Notes: Cells report coefficients from regressions relating the percentage of neutral or right positions legislators took on questions about state interventions and social spending to occupational indicators and (in the second and fourth models) controls for party, country, religion, gender, age, and marital status. All variables are indicators unless otherwise noted.

⁺*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01, two tailed.

Table A6: Regression Models Relating Alternative Measures of Class to Latin American Legislators' Economic Attitudes

Dependent Variable Controls?	State Functions			Social Spending		
	No	No	No	No	No	No
<i>Occupation</i>						
Businessperson	7.52** (2.22)	6.97** (2.27)	7.39** (2.28)	7.59** (2.77)	7.72** (2.82)	7.21* (2.83)
Private-sector Professional	7.60** (2.25)	6.94** (2.38)	7.14** (2.30)	8.24** (2.80)	9.45** (2.96)	7.65** (2.85)
Military / Law Enforcement	7.53 (6.31)	6.18 (6.32)	7.79 (6.33)	8.65 (7.86)	7.33 (7.85)	8.42 (7.86)
Lawyer	8.74** (2.50)	8.16** (2.66)	8.17** (2.58)	8.80** (3.11)	10.63** (3.31)	8.37** (3.21)
Politician	7.75** (2.35)	7.13** (2.45)	7.21** (2.37)	7.79** (2.92)	8.58** (3.04)	6.91* (2.95)
Service-based Professional	9.79** (2.54)	8.63** (2.63)	9.43** (2.56)	11.42** (3.16)	11.72** (3.27)	10.92** (3.18)
Worker (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>Education</i>						
None	---	-0.21 (26.77)	---	---	-13.19 (33.26)	---
Primary	---	-6.68 (5.48)	---	---	-7.52 (6.81)	---
Secondary	---	-3.35 (2.40)	---	---	1.77 (2.99)	---
University degree (lower)	---	-1.50 (1.95)	---	---	4.95* (2.42)	---
University degree (higher)	---	-5.403** (1.519)	---	---	-4.481* (1.888)	---
Postgraduate degree (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>Father's Occupation</i>						
Businessperson	---	---	0.07 (1.66)	---	---	0.94 (2.06)

Private-sector Professional	---	---	-1.67 (2.36)	---	---	-1.64 (2.93)
Military / Law Enforcement	---	---	-1.10 (5.36)	---	---	1.82 (6.66)
Lawyer	---	---	2.82 (3.51)	---	---	-0.14 (4.36)
Politician	---	---	5.69* (2.39)	---	---	10.273** (2.969)
Service-based Professional	---	---	-0.93 (2.94)	---	---	-2.93 (3.66)
Worker (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	1569	1567	1569	1569	1567	1569
<i>R</i> ²	0.0127	0.0213	0.0244	0.0095	0.0227	0.260
St. Err.	24.597	24.525	24.505	0.0095	30.472	30.435

Source: USAL surveys.

Notes: Cells report coefficients from regressions relating the percentage of neutral or right positions legislators took on questions about state interventions and social spending to occupational, educational, and parental occupational indicators. Coefficients for the “no info” occupations and the intercepts are omitted but available on request. Whether the legislator was from a white-collar or working-class job was correlated with education (the average value on the five-point education scale was 3.02 or roughly “some college” for working-class candidates and 3.96 or roughly “college” for white-collar candidates) and parental occupation (60 percent of legislators from working-class jobs were raised by working-class parents, compared to only 28 percent of legislators from white-collar jobs).

⁺*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01, two tailed.

Table A7: Regressions Relating Class and Argentine Legislators' Economic Attitudes

Dependent Variable Controls?	State Functions		Social Spending	
	No	Yes	No	Yes
Businessperson	7.02 (8.43)	6.51 (8.39)	19.09 (12.79)	10.51 (13.46)
Private-sector Professional	17.31* (7.58)	11.71 (7.73)	28.02* (11.49)	17.63 (12.39)
Military / Law Enforcement	49.00* (21.72)	19.06 (22.93)	31.43 (32.96)	11.74 (36.78)
Lawyer	10.00 (7.32)	11.40 (7.47)	11.29 (11.11)	8.48 (11.98)
Politician	7.25 (8.24)	5.93 (9.02)	7.90 (12.50)	1.91 (14.47)
Service-based Professional	8.38 (8.23)	3.91 (9.03)	18.06 (12.49)	11.36 (14.47)
Worker (omitted)	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	128	112	128	112
<i>R</i> ²	0.0778	0.4246	0.0715	0.2664
St. Err.	20.684	18.747	31.384	30.064

Source: USAL surveys.

Notes: Cells report coefficients from regressions relating the percentage of neutral or right positions legislators took on questions about state interventions and social spending to occupational indicators and (in the second and fourth models) controls for legislator characteristics (party, religion, gender, age, and marital status) and constituency characteristics (urbanization, literacy, the proportion of the adult population working in agriculture or fishing, the proportion of the adult population working in manufacturing or mining, and poverty). Coefficients for control variables and the “no info” occupation are omitted but available on request.

⁺*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01, two tailed

Table A8: Regressions Relating Class and Argentine Legislators' Economic Choices

Complete dataset:

Dependent Variable Party Controls?	Spending Attitudes		Bill Sponsorship		Roll-Call Voting	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
White-collar: private-sector	24.97* (10.90)	24.69* (10.76)	15.81** (4.26)	12.77** (4.27)	-4.03 (12.53)	-7.31 (7.13)
White-collar: gov't / law	12.34 (10.48)	13.70 (10.37)	9.33** (3.22)	6.75* (3.24)	-2.77 (11.92)	-6.32 (6.86)
Blue-collar (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	128	128	376	376	215	215
<i>R</i> ²	0.0553	0.0867	0.0150	0.0713	0.0006	0.7051
St. Err.	31.147	30.748	28.533	27.776	32.636	17.812

Complete dataset, with constituency and legislator demographic controls

Dependent Variable Party Controls?	Spending Attitudes		Bill Sponsorship		Roll-Call Voting	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
White-collar: private-sector	24.36* (11.38)	23.79* (11.21)	10.54* (4.61)	8.34+ (4.41)	0.43 (12.64)	-5.63 (7.10)
White-collar: gov't / law	14.45 (10.96)	14.96 (10.80)	6.43+ (3.71)	4.21 (3.64)	0.18 (11.88)	-5.80 (6.85)
Blue-collar (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	118	118	376	376	211	211
<i>R</i> ²	0.0915	0.1264	0.0610	0.1103	0.0312	0.7211
St. Err.	31.423	30.957	28.342	27.673	32.846	17.711

Complete dataset, plus bills coded "neutral" or for which coders could not agree:

Dependent Variable Party Controls?	Spending Attitudes		Bill Sponsorship		Roll-Call Voting	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
White-collar: private-sector	24.97* (10.90)	24.69* (10.76)	12.72* (5.49)	9.80+ (5.73)	0.43 (12.64)	-5.63 (7.10)
White-collar: gov't / law	12.34 (10.48)	13.70 (10.37)	12.08* (4.83)	9.10+ (5.11)	0.18 (11.88)	-5.80 (6.85)

Blue-collar (omitted)	---	---	---	---	---	---
<i>N</i>	128	128	414	414	211	211
<i>R</i> ²	0.0553	0.1187	0.0073	0.0661	0.0312	0.7211
St. Err.	31.147	30.577	30.876	30.058	32.846	17.711

Sources: USAL surveys, Directorio Legislativo, Alemán et al. (2009), and authors' data collection.

Notes: To save space, the intercept and the coefficients for party ideology (spending attitudes models) and individual parties (bill sponsorship and roll-call voting models) are omitted, as are the demographic controls, which we use in all of the models in the middle panel (urbanization, literacy, the proportion of the adult population working in agriculture or fishing, the proportion of the adult population working in manufacturing or mining, and poverty).

⁺*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01, two tailed.

Instructions for Bill Coders

Please read this coding procedure carefully, and contact Noam or Nick if you have any questions before you begin or while you are working.

Noam will supply you with information about the 1,894 bills that were introduced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in 2000 and 2001. **Your job will be to read the description and/or text of each bill, determine whether the bill deals with economic issues, and if it does, code the bill as either “left,” “right,” or “neutral.”**

First, create a spreadsheet with three columns labeled “**Bill Number**,” “**Economic**,” and “**Ideology**.” Then, for each bill, complete the following steps.

Step 1: Create an entry for the bill.

Record the bill number in the column labeled “**Bill Number**”.

Step 2: Read the bill.

Read the title and summary of the bill. If the text of the bill is available, read it quickly with an eye for any details that were unclear in the title and/or summary.

Step 3: Record whether the bill deals with economic issues.

Based on your reading of the bill, record a “1” in the column labeled “Economic” if the bill deals centrally with one or more of the issues listed below. (Please be sure you are familiar with what each of these kinds of policies means before you begin. If you aren’t sure, please ask.)

- price controls
- unemployment, unemployment insurance, or other jobs programs
- government-sponsored education (primary, secondary, or college)
- public housing
- environmental regulations
- infrastructure development
- health care
- public safety
- pensions or social security
- other provisions for citizens’ basic needs

If the bill **does not** deal with any of the issues above but **does** deal with some other economic issue—for example, taxation, trade, the budget, or privatization—record a “2” in the column labeled “Economic.”

Otherwise, record a “0”.

Step 4: If the bill deals with an economic issue, record the general ideological direction of the bill.

Based on your reading of the bill, record an “L” in the column labeled “Ideology” if you believe the bill is generally more to the political left, that is, if the bill would increase government involvement in or spending on programs that address the issues above.

Record an “R” if you believe the bill is generally more to the political right, that is, if the bill would decrease government involvement in or spending on programs that address these issues.

Record an “N” if you believe the bill is politically neutral: neither left nor right. Or record a “?” if you are unsure whether the bill is left, right, or neutral based on the materials you have.